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Abstract
This thesis examines the impact of international capital flows on small open economies
from a theoretical and empirical perspective. The first chapter shows that where maturity
mismatch is widespread, as in emerging markets, greater capital flow volatility negatively
affects investment, output, and aggregate productivity. I build a model of a small open
economy in which financial frictions force firms to engage in maturity mismatch, fund-
ing long-term projects with short-term debt. Greater uncertainty regarding the future
availability of foreign borrowing causes firms to cut long-term investment, depressing
aggregate investment and generating an endogenous drop in aggregate productivity.
The second chapter examines the relationship between capital flow volatility and eco-
nomic performance using unique monthly frequency data set on international capital
flows. I show that it is specifically the volatility of portfolio debt flows that negatively
affects investment. Using financial development as a proxy for the extent of maturity
mismatch in the economy, I find that the negative impact of debt flows is smaller where
financial markets are more developed. Finally, I use industry-level data to show capital
flow volatility depresses investment more in industries with longer average time-to-build.
These findings are consistent with a role for maturity mismatch in transmitting volatility
shocks.
The third chapter studies episodes of large capital inflows. These events are typically
followed by an economic downturn and a reallocation of labor and capital into the non-
tradables sector. The extent of labor reallocation is significantly related to the depth and
length of the post-episode downturn. We interpret our results using a model of a two
sector economy, showing that capital inflows episodes generated by a fall in international
interest rates or a rise in future productivity will push labor into the notradables sector.
Inflows caused by a productivity increase that has already occurred shift labor into trad-
ables production. Allocation of labor therefore provides information on the underlying
shock driving the capital inflows.
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Introduction
Since the late 1980s, emerging market economies have steadily liberalized controls on
international capital flows (Chinn and Ito, 2006). This change in policy has coincided
with a dramatic increase in the size of net capital flows to these economies, from an
average of 30 billion dollars per year in the late 1980s to nearly one trillion dollars
annually during the last five years (WEO, 2011), and an even greater increase in gross
flows. The benefits to recipient countries during this period have been decidedly mixed,
however (Kose et al., 2006; Rodrik and Subramanian, 2009). This dissertation presents
new evidence on the costs and benefits of openness to international capital flows. The
first two chapters use theory and empirical evidence to show that the financial uncertainty
generated by the volatility of international capital flows adversely affects investment and
output in emerging economies where financial markets are underdeveloped. The third
chapter studies episodes of exceptionally large capital inflows and finds that these are
typically followed by significant economic downturns, the length and severity of which is
related to the sectoral allocation of resources during the inflows episode.
In Chapter 1, I build a model of a small open economy and show that changes in the
level of uncertainty regarding the availability of foreign borrowing affect investment, out-
put, and aggregate productivity in an economy where financial market imperfections
force firms to engage in maturity mismatch, borrowing short-term to finance long-term
projects. I begin the analysis by documenting a set of novel empirical facts on the rela-
tionship between capital flow volatility and output over the business cycle in 16 major
emerging markets and 11 small, open high-income countries. These facts motivate my
focus on maturity mismatch as a channel through which shocks to capital flow volatility
affect the real economy. I then use the model to show that when maturity mismatch is
widespread, as is the case in emerging markets, capital flow volatility contributes to the
volatility of output and total factor productivity (TFP) and to the skewed distribution of
growth rates. When financial frictions force firms to rely on short-term debt, long-term in-
vestments entail rollover risk. Greater uncertainty about the future availability of foreign
borrowing increases rollover risk and causes firms to cut back on long-term investment,
depressing both aggregate investment and TFP. As a result, capital flow volatility am-
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plifies macroeconomic fluctuations in emerging markets, but not in advanced economies
where firms can finance long-term projects without engaging in maturity mismatch. The
interaction of uncertainty and maturity mismatch increases the negative effects of sud-
den stops and dampens the positive investment response to surges in capital inflows,
contributing to the skewed distribution of growth rates.
Chapter 2 explores the empirical relationship between capital flow volatility and maturity
mismatch and demonstrates that several features of this relationship are consistent with
a role for maturity mismatch in transmitting shocks to capital flow volatility. I first
confirm that the bivariate relationships discussed in Chapter 1 are robust to the addition
of additional controls. Thus it remains the case that portfolio capital flow volatility
affects output and investment emerging markets but not advanced economies, while it
is specifically the volatility of portfolio debt flows that negatively affects investment,
while the volatility of portfolio equity flows has no effect. Since debt flows can generate
maturity mismatch while equity flows cannot, this is consistent with a role for maturity
mismatch in transmitting shocks to volatility. Second, I use financial development as a
proxy for the extent of maturity mismatch in the economy and find that the negative
impact of debt flows is smaller where financial markets are more developed. Finally, I use
industry-level data to show that increases in capital flow volatility have a larger negative
impact on industries which have longer average time-to-build.
In Chapter 3, my co-authors and I analyzed the experiences of 69 middle- and high-income
countries that underwent episodes of large capital inflows between 1975 and 2010. We
show that while these events coincide with an initial increase in output and productivity,
they are typically followed by a significant downturn. Large capital inflows are also
associated with a reallocation of labor and capital into the nontradables sector. Episodes
in which labor shifts the nontradables sector are followed by longer and deeper post-
episode downturns. We interpret our empirical results using a model of a two sector open
economy, showing that capital inflows episodes generated by a fall in the international
interest rate or a rise in expected future productivity will push labor into the notradables
sector. By contrast, inflows caused by a productivity increase which has already occurred
shift labor into the tradables sector. Thus allocation of labor may provide an indication
of the underlying shock driving the capital inflows.
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Chapter 1
International Capital Flows,
Financial Uncertainty, and Maturity
Mismatch
1.1 Introduction
When comparing the growth performance of emerging markets to that of advanced
economies, two major differences are evident. First, output is significantly more volatile
in emerging markets.1 Second, growth rates in emerging markets are more negatively
skewed, exhibiting periodic sharp contractions without correspondingly large growth
surges.2 Recent work has showed that fluctuations in aggregate total factor productivity
(TFP) are the key driver of both the volatility of growth and its skewed distribution.3
These findings raise the question of why the efficiency with which capital and labor are
1Numerous studies have found that the volatility of GDP in emerging markets averages twice that
of a typical advanced economy. Lucas (1988) comments on the greater volatility of growth rates in low
income countries. Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) systematically document
the higher macroeconomic volatility of emerging markets in recent decades using quarterly frequency
data. The greater volatility of developing and emerging economies over longer periods is documented by
Garc´ıa-Cicco et al. (2010) and Koren and Tenreyro (2013) using annual data.
2Growth rates in advanced economies are also negatively skewed, but to a to a much lesser extent
than in emerging markets. For emerging markets, the average skewness of annual rates from 1960 to 2010
was -1.25, while for small advanced economies skewness averaged around -0.4. Rodrik (1999), Raddatz
(2007), and Mendoza (2010) provide evidence of the asymmetric distribution of growth rates in emerging
markets.
3Bergoeing et al. (2002) show that this is the case for Mexico and Chile in the 1980s. Mendoza (2006)
examines the role of TFP in the downturn and recovery that followed 1994 Mexican crisis. Evidence on
the role of TFP in Argentina’s volatile economic performance can by found in Kydland and Zarazaga
(2007) and Kehoe (2007). Whereas these studies employ annual data, Aguiar and Gopinath (2007) use
quarterly data to analyze the behavior of TFP in 13 emerging markets and 13 advanced economies. Meza
and Quintin (2007) study the role of TFP in Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand during the Asian financial
crisis
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employed appears to fluctuate more substantially over time in some economies than in
others. Is the elevated macroeconomic volatility observed in emerging markets simply a
result of these economies being hit by larger fundamental shocks? Or does some feature
of emerging markets cause them to respond differently when hit by shocks that affect all
economies?
In this paper I show that when maturity mismatch is widespread, as is the case in emerging
markets, capital flow volatility contributes to the volatility of output and TFP and to
the skewed distribution of growth rates. When financial frictions force firms to rely on
short-term debt, long-term investments entail rollover risk. Greater uncertainty about the
future availability of foreign borrowing increases rollover risk and causes firms to cut back
on long-term investment, depressing both aggregate investment and TFP. As a result,
capital flow volatility amplifies macroeconomic fluctuations in emerging markets, but not
in advanced economies where firms can finance long-term projects without engaging in
maturity mismatch. The interaction of uncertainty and maturity mismatch increases the
negative effects of sudden stops and dampens the positive investment response to surges
in capital inflows, contributing to the skewed distribution of growth rates.
I begin by documenting two new empirical facts regarding fluctuations in capital flow
volatility over the business cycle. First, I show that capital flow volatility in a set of
16 emerging markets is significantly countercyclical and leads the business cycle. By
contrast, in a group of 11 small advanced economies capital flow volatility is acyclical.
The difference in cyclicality motivates my focus on capital flow volatility as an explanation
for the differing behavior of output.
I then separate the debt and equity components of portfolio capital flows and show that
the negative relationship between volatility and output is much more pronounced for
debt flows than for equity. This second empirical fact leads me to concentrate on the
distinctive properties of portfolio debt flows. Unlike equity issuance, short-term debt can
generate maturity mismatch on a firm’s balance sheet if the firm’s assets have a longer
maturity. While maturity mismatch is a fundamental feature of banks, as in the canonical
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model, nonfinancial firms also incur maturity mismatch if
they issue short-term debt to finance long-term investment projects.
To study the impact of capital flow volatility on output in the presence of maturity
mismatch, I model firms’ borrowing and investment decisions in a small open economy.
Domestic firms owned by risk neutral entrepreneurs take on short-term foreign debt
to finance investment in a portfolio of short- and long-term projects. The long-term
technology is more productive but takes two periods to produce a return, so that long-
term investments requires firms to engage in maturity mismatch. I incorporate capital
flow volatility into the model by introducing uncertainty regarding the availability of
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borrowing during the intermediate period. If foreign borrowing is sufficiently scarce,
firms will prematurely liquidate their long-term projects. Thus the combination of firms’
inability to borrow long term and their uncertainty about future borrowing means that
firms face rollover risk.
The presence of rollover risk means that firms face a trade-off when deciding how much
to borrow and invest in long-term projects. Higher leverage increases their return on
equity when borrowing is abundant during the life of the long-term project. If external
funds are scarce, however, greater debt-financed long-term investment means that the
firm must liquidate a larger share of the project, lowering the return. Moreover, the firm
must take into account that higher debt also increases the probability that it will be
forced to liquidate.
To analyze the impact of the fluctuations in capital flow volatility that I observe in the
data, I examine how investment decisions change in response to an increase in uncer-
tainty regarding the future availability of foreign lending. The uncertainty shock induces
entrepreneurs to scale back their investments in long-term projects, and output falls even
if external financing remains plentiful. This happens for two reasons. First, greater un-
certainty increases the probability that firms will be forced to liquidate their projects.
Second, a rise in uncertainty reduces the expected return on the long-term project in
states of the world in which liquidation occurs. As a result, greater uncertainty reduces
the optimal level of long-term investment. Uncertainty has no impact on the optimal
level of investment in short-term projects, since these do not incur maturity mismatch.
The mechanism in my model increases the volatility of output and TFP observed in
emerging markets and contributes to the skewed distribution of their growth rates. Be-
cause volatility shocks alter long-term investment while leaving short-term investment
unchanged, they generate fluctuations in aggregate investment. For the same reason,
volatility shocks alter the share of investment allocated to more productive long-term
projects, leading to endogenous changes in aggregate TFP. This is in contrast to the
existing literature on emerging market business cycles, which treats more volatile TFP as
exogenous (e.g. Neumeyer and Perri, 2005; Aguiar and Gopinath, 2007). Since a jump in
uncertainty both depresses investment and reduces TFP, output falls as well. Conversely,
a reduction in uncertainty boosts investment, productivity, and output. Therefore when
maturity mismatch is a feature of the macroeconomy, shocks to capital flow volatility
constitute an additional source of variation in investment, productivity, and output, in-
creasing their volatility.
My model implies that output and TFP are more volatile in emerging markets than
in advanced economies because uncertainty shocks affect investment only where matu-
rity mismatch is present. Where firms can easily issue long-term debt and equity, as
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in advanced economies, variations in capital flow volatility have little or no impact on
investment, productivity, and output. Other models in which uncertainty shocks affect
investment rely on either risk aversion (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al., 2011) or irreversible
investment (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Bloom, 2009) to generate a response. However,
since neither the degree of risk aversion nor the extent of irreversibility are different in
emerging markets as compared to advanced economies, those models are not helpful in
explaining why output volatility differs between the two groups of countries. Thus the
maturity mismatch channel of transmission for volatility shocks that I introduce in this
paper is not only novel, but particularly suited to explain the greater volatility of output
and TFP in emerging markets.
The model presented here also provides an explanation for the negatively skewed distri-
bution of growth rates in emerging markets. A sudden cutoff in capital inflows raises
uncertainty about the future availability of foreign borrowing, depressing investment in
addition to the negative effects of the shock itself. On the other hand, while a large
jump in inflows will increase the capital available to fund investment, it will also generate
uncertainty, thereby dampening the positive response. This asymmetric amplification
means that the interaction of capital flow volatility and maturity mismatch contributes
to the skewed pattern of output growth in emerging markets.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I motivate my focus on the role
of capital flow volatility by documenting its business cycle properties. In Section 1.3, I
model the interaction between capital flow volatility and maturity mismatch in a small
open economy. Section 1.4 concludes and discusses directions for further research.
1.1.1 Related Literature
This paper contributes to several areas of literature. First, it relates to the growing body
of work analyzing the distinctive properties of business cycles in emerging markets. From
this perspective, the greater output volatility in emerging markets is the result of these
economies being hit by different, more volatile shocks than advanced economies. The
shocks in emerging market RBC models include not only productivity shocks (Aguiar
and Gopinath, 2007) but also shocks to the level (Neumeyer and Perri, 2005) and volatil-
ity (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al., 2011) of interest rates. My approach differs from this
literature in two important respects. First, in my model emerging markets respond dif-
ferently when hit by the same shocks as advanced economies, rather than being hit by
different shocks. The difference in response is due to the presence of realistic financial
market imperfections in my model. Second, whereas the emerging market RBC litera-
ture treats the higher TFP as exogenous, in my model the greater volatility of TFP in
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emerging markets is generated endogenously by the interaction of volatility shocks and
maturity mismatch.
Second, this paper contributes to research on maturity mismatch. Whereas others have
documented the prevalence of maturity mismatch in emerging markets, empirically an-
alyzed its effects, or used theory to understand its causes, I build a model analyze the
consequences of maturity mismatch, in particular its implications for the transmission of
uncertainty shocks. Although the average maturity of emerging market debt has length-
ened somewhat in the last decade (Burger et al., 2012), the median share of short-term
debt in the total debt of nonfinancial corporations remains 64 percent in emerging mar-
kets, compared with 39 percent in advanced economies (Fan et al., 2012).4 Several recent
empirical papers have studied the extent to which maturity mismatch amplifies the effects
of financial crises (Bleakley and Cowan, 2010; Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2010; Benmelech and
Dvir, 2011; Kim et al., 2012).
Motivated by these empirical facts, many authors have explored how information frictions
and agency problems can render it optimal for firms to borrow short-term to finance long-
term investments in these economies (Chang and Velasco, 2000; Tirole, 2003; Jeanne,
2009; Broner et al., 2011; Bengui, 2011; Farhi and Tirole, 2012). In this paper, I highlight
a previously unexplored consequence of the maturity mismatch for which others have
provided empirical evidence and microfoundations.
Third, this paper contributes to the extensive literature on sudden stops, episodes in
which rapid shifts from current account deficit to surplus are accompanied by large drops
in output. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001, and subsequent work) show how maturity
mismatch can amplify the effects of an exogenous drop in the availability of foreign
capital. The mechanism in my model amplifies such negative shocks, but also dampens
the effects of surges in capital inflows. It therefore helps explain the skewed growth
patterns discussed above.
More recent work on sudden stops has focused on how fractional borrowing constraints
amplify exogenous shocks via Fisherian debt deflation (Mendoza, 2010; Jeanne and Ko-
rinek, 2010; Bianchi, 2011). This class of models has had notable success in explaining
not only the volatility of output in emerging economies, but also the volatility of TFP
and the skewed distribution of growth rates. A key difference between these papers and
my own approach is that whereas they employ a fractional borrowing constraint as a
shorthand for a variety of credit market imperfections, the maturity mismatch present in
my model is a directly observable feature of emerging market economies.
This paper compliments research on sudden stops in that I show that in addition to the
4The IMF’s 2005 Global Financial Stability Report provides an overview of the evidence on maturity
mismatch in emerging markets.
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direct impact of sudden stops analyzed in the existing literature, the uncertainty gener-
ated by the possibility that a sudden stop will occur also has macroeconomic implications.
Moreover, the uncertainty affects output, investment, and productivity not only during
crisis episodes but also during tranquil times. In this regard, this paper provides a formal
analysis of the claim by Joesph Stiglitz regarding financial crises in emerging markets
that “it is not only the downturn itself which has lasting effects, but the very presence of
the risk of instability that is likely to discourage investment” Stiglitz (2000) .
Several other studies seek to explain the empirical facts motivating this paper. Rancie`re
et al. (2008) set out to understand the skewed distribution of emerging market growth
rates and show that while high levels of investment in risky projects render the economy
vulnerable to occasional crises, the net effect of this behavior is growth enhancing. How-
ever, they explain long-run growth rather than the business cycle fluctuations that are
the focus of this paper.
In attempting to explain high volatility in emerging markets, my modeling approach is
similar to that of Aghion et al. (2010), who demonstrate that maturity mismatch amplifies
the effects of productivity shocks in the presence of a fractional borrowing constraint (due
to their impact on net worth). The source of shocks in the models differs, however, in
that I analyze the effects of variations in the volatility of borrowing constraints, rather
than in the level of productivity.
Also studying the sources of volatility in developing and emerging economies, Koren and
Tenreyro (2007, 2013) decompose aggregate output volatility into country-level, sector-
level, and idiosyncratic volatility and build an endogenous growth model that explains
the empirical facts they document. The model presented here proposes an additional
source of cross-country differences in output volatility. In particular, investment and
output in sectors with longer project durations will be more volatile in countries with
less developed financial systems. My model also provides an explanation for the negative
relationship between firm size and age, on the one hand, and output volatility, on the
other, that Koren and Tenreyro observe in a broad sample of countries. Older firms are
less reliant on the short-term debt, and therefore engage in less of the maturity mismatch
that boosts output volatility in my model.
1.2 Capital Flow Volatility and the Business Cycle
In this section, I examine the business cycle properties of capital flow volatility. I begin
by introducing a novel monthly frequency data set on portfolio capital flows to 16 ma-
jor emerging markets and 11 small open advanced economies. I analyze portfolio flows
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rather than FDI in part due to data availability, but primarily because of the extensive
evidence that the portfolio flows are significantly more volatile (Montiel and Reinhart,
1999; Albuquerque, 2003; Alfaro et al., 2007).
I then document two new empirical facts. First, I show that the volatility of portfolio
capital inflows to emerging markets is countercyclical and leads the business cycle. In
small open advanced economies, however, that volatility is acyclical or weakly procylcial.
The difference in comovement suggests a role for capital flow volatility in explaining
the distinctive patterns of output growth in emerging markets. Second, I find that the
countercyclicality of portfolio capital flow volatility is driven by the volatility of debt
flows rather than equity. As a result, I focus my analysis on properties specific to such
debt flows.
1.2.1 Data Description
To capture fluctuations in capital flow volatility over time, I use monthly frequency data
on capital flows to a set of emerging markets and small open advanced economies. Where
possible, I collect monthly balance of payments data directly from central banks.5 In
five cases, the data were supplemented with data on purchases and sales of equities and
bonds by foreigners obtained from financial markets and regulatory agencies.6 Appendix
A provides details of the data sources for each country in the sample.
In supplementing balance of payments data with financial market data, I strike a balance
between covering a wide sample of countries and capturing all capital flows to each
country. My use of financial market data is in line with its increasing use in studies
of international capital flows (e.g. Henry, 2003; Bekaert et al., 2005; Gupta and Yuan,
2009). Several recent studies have also made use of data on transactions by mutual funds,
which are available for a larger group of countries than are included in my sample (e.g.
Hau and Rey, 2008; Raddatz and Schmukler, 2011; Jotikasthira et al., 2011; Fratzscher,
2011). However, the mutual fund data capture only around 15 percent of the capital
flows in the balance of payments (Lambert et al., 2011). By contrast, the financial data I
collect account for between 74 and 100 percent of the flows in the IMF’s quarterly balance
of payments data.7 Thus while using balance of payments data narrows my sample, it
ensures that the data more fully capture capital flows to the countries in my data set.
The monthly data capital flows data that I collect measure the net change in the value of
5Specifically, the data on portfolio capital flows come from the line “portfolio investment, liabilities”
of the financial account, as defined in the fifth edition of the IMF Balance of Payments Manual (BPM5).
6Financial market data were used for Colombia, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa.
7Appendix A includes a discussion of the relationship between the monthly data in my sample and
quarterly balance of payments data
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domestic equities and bonds held by foreigners each month, or what the literature refers to
as gross portfolio capital inflows (Rothenberg and Warnock, 2011a; Forbes and Warnock,
2012a; Broner et al., 2013).8 This paper does not analyze capital flows initiated by
domestic residents, which are generally called gross capital outflows. Although so-called
capital flight has in many cases contributed to large outflows in times of crisis, the vast
majority of sudden stop episodes are driven by the actions of foreign investors rather
than domestic residents (Caldero´n and Kubota, 2011; Rothenberg and Warnock, 2011a).
Moreover, the disruption in terms of growth, consumption, and investment associated
with capital flow driven by foreign investors is generally larger than that following outflows
driven primarily by residents (Rothenberg and Warnock, 2011a).
Having compiled monthly data on capital flows, I measure their realized volatility by
calculating a trailing 12-month standard deviation each month. I then normalize by trend
quarterly GDP so that my measure captures the magnitude of capital flow volatility
relative to the size of the economy. Thus capital flow volatility in country i month t
(V oli,t) is defined as:
V oli,m =
√
1
12
∑11
j=0(flowi,m−j − flowi,m)2
Trend GDPi,m
where flowi,m =
1
12
11∑
j=0
flowi,m−j
Where flowi,m is the level of capital inflows in country i in in month t and flowi is the
mean level of capital inflow over the previous 12 months. The term Trend GDPi,m refers
the the trend level GDP for the quarter in which month m falls. Alternative measures of
capital flow volatility are discussed in Appendix A.
Table 1.1 presents descriptive statistics on the resulting data on capital flow volatility.
The data cover 16 emerging market economies for periods ranging from 7 years to more
than 20 years. All regions containing emerging markets are represented. The sample
includes 14 of the 32 countries that make up the JPMorgan Emerging Markets Bond
Index-Global (EMBI-G). These account for nearly 70 percent of the combined GDP of
the EMBI-G economies.9 Also in the data set are India, Korea, and the Czech Republic,
which are included in the S&P/International Finance Corporation Emerging Markets
Database Investable Index (S&P IFCI Index). The advanced economies in the sample
include four southern European countries and four Scandinavian countries, as well as
Austria, Belgium, and Canada. The data therefore provide a meaningful view of major
emerging market economies and of small open advanced economies.
8Somewhat confusingly, the term gross capital inflows in fact refers to the net purchases of domestic
assets by foreigners.
9Published by JPMorgan, the EMBI-G a widely used index of the yield on debt issued by low- and
middle-income countries.
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Table 1.1: Capital Flow Volatility in Emerging Markets, Descriptive Statistics
Total Portfolio Inflows1 Portfolio Equity Inflows1 Portfolio Debt Inflows1
Min Mean Max Min Mean Max Min Mean Max
Emerging Markets
Overall 0.04 1.28 9.23 0.02 0.66 7.9 0 0.92 7.01
Turkey 0.38 1.13 2.83 0.04 0.23 0.59 0.33 1.05 2.5
South Africa 0.63 1.44 2.78 0.35 0.81 1.55 0.51 1.08 2.23
Brazil 0.25 0.92 3.15 0.1 0.45 1.02 0.16 0.7 2.43
Chile 0.57 1.06 1.94 0.13 0.38 0.85 0.5 0.98 1.88
Colombia 0.04 0.43 2.4 0.02 0.32 2.36 0 0.17 0.5
Mexico 1.11 4.23 9.23 1.17 3.9 7.9 0.07 0.61 1.87
India 0.08 0.39 1.05 0.06 0.34 1.01 0.02 0.11 0.33
Indonesia – – – 0.08 0.26 0.98 – – –
Korea 0.24 1.03 2.36 0.04 0.68 1.79 0.23 0.69 1.9
Malaysia – – – – – – 1.41 3.49 7.01
Philippines 0.94 1.69 2.89 0.06 0.39 1.1 0.95 1.58 2.79
Thailand 0.15 0.87 2.46 0.13 0.63 1.59 0.02 0.57 2.14
Bulgaria 0.24 1.08 4.31 0.03 0.19 1.02 0.24 1.1 5.03
Czech Republic 0.42 1.43 2.84 0.19 0.48 0.9 0.29 1.32 2.76
Hungary – – – 0.11 0.52 1.43 – – –
Poland 0.72 1.31 2 0.11 0.32 0.6 0.39 1.24 1.97
Advanced Economies
Overall 0.51 3.66 13.34 0.05 1.15 4.29 0.45 3.11 12.36
Austria 0.61 2.54 5.13 – – – – – –
Belgium 3.1 5.28 7.57 – – – – – –
Canada 0.51 1.55 3.11 0.05 0.7 2.93 0.45 1.29 2.4
Denmark 2.22 4.67 9.2 0.24 1.17 3.54 2.2 4.49 8.71
Finland 2.16 5.24 9.81 0.24 1.36 4.29 1.62 4.86 9.72
Norway 0.9 2.59 6.02 0.31 0.74 1.89 0.81 2.36 6.01
Sweden 5.71 9.13 12.37 0.21 0.49 0.92 5.9 9.2 12.36
Greece 2.89 5.85 13.34 – – – – – –
Italy 1.18 2.73 5.03 0.47 1.22 2.9 1.24 2.73 4.96
Portugal 0.73 2.88 5.87 0.58 1.94 3.6 0.54 2.13 4.28
Spain 1.21 3.1 5.64 0.37 1.28 2.41 0.91 2.4 4.56
Source: IFS, national sources
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In all but four countries, monthly debt flows are on average more volatile than equity.
Among the emerging markets in the sample, the volatility of equity flows relative to the
size of the economy is largest in Mexico in late 1994 and early 1995, at eight percent
of trend GDP. The maximum debt flow volatility is 7 percent of GDP and occurs in
Malaysia in late 2008. The minimum values of volatility as a share of GDP both occur
in Colombia in the early 2000s, a time when the country had capital controls in place.
Capital flows to advanced economies are significantly more volatile than they are in
emerging markets, with an average volatility of total portfolio inflows three times as
large. The volatility of the two components of portfolio inflows is larger by a similar
margin. The maximum and minimum values of volatility are likewise dramatically larger
in the small open advanced economies than in emerging markets. The generally higher
volatility in high-income countries presumably reflects their greater openness to capital
inflows. According to the index of captial account openness constructed by Chinn and
Ito (2006), the emerging markets in the sample are on average somewhat less open than
the worldwide average, while the advanced economies are typically much more open than
the world average.10
Figure 1.1 plots the standard deviation of monthly capital flows as a percentage of trendl
GDP for the economies in my dataset. The figures make clear that capital flow volatility
varies substantially across countries and over time. Volatility is generally high during
crisis episodes, including the 1994 Mexican crisis, the 1997 Asian crisis, the 1998 Russian
crisis, and the 2008 global financial crisis. At the same time, there is substantial variation
in relatively tranquil periods such as the mid-2000s.
1.2.2 Stylized Facts on Capital Flows and their Volatility
The figures in the previous section made clear that the volatility of portfolio capital flows
varies over time. To get a sense of how changes in volatility relate to the business cycle
in these economies, I examine their comovements with real GDP.11 I take as the value of
volatility in each quarter the value of my monthly volatility measure in the final month
of the quarter, since realized volatility was calculated using a backward-looking standard
deviation. Figure 1.2 presents the correlation between capital flow volatility and output
at different lags. Volatility leads the business cycle by three quarters and is significantly
countercyclical. This pattern, evident for these economies as a whole, is the same in 8
10The emerging markets average a Chinn-Ito score of -0.22 while the advanced economies average is
1.5.
11In particular, quarterly real GDP data obtained from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics
were seasonally adjusted using the TRAMO-SEATS algorithm implemented in the Demetra+ software
available from Eurostat. As is standard in exercises of this type, detrending was done using a Hodrick-
Prescott filter. Results were nearly identical when deviations from a quadratic trend were used.
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Figure 1.1: Portfolio Capital Flow Volatility
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of the 13 individual countries for which data are available, and capital flow volatility is
never significantly procyclical (see Section A.4 of Appendix A for data on the cyclicality
of capital flows in individual countries).
In contrast, capital flow volatility is not significantly correlated with output at any lag in a
the small open advanced economies for which monthly capital flows data were available.
Volatility is leading significantly and countercyclical in Portugal, but this is not the
pattern in any of the other advanced economies. The lack of a relationship between
output and capital flow volatility is particularly striking giving that portfolio capital flow
volatility is much larger relative to the size of the economy in high-income countries as
in emerging markets (Table 1.1). Even though advanced economies experience greater
capital flow volatility, it appears unrelated to the business cycle. This difference in the
cyclical properties of capital flow volatility motivates my focus on capital flow volatility
as a potential factor explaining the distinctive features of the growth performance in
emerging markets.
Figure 1.2: Cyclicality of Portfolio Capital Flow Volatility,
Emerging Markets and Advanced Economies
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In Figure 1.3, I disaggregate portfolio capital inflows into their two component parts.
Overall, portfolio debt flow volatility leads the business cycle and is countercyclical to
a statistically significant extent. This pattern also holds for the majority of individual
countries. By contrast, portfolio equity flow volatility does not significantly lead the
business cycle and is procyclical at lags of one quarter and longer. The contemporaneous
correlation between the volatility of equity and output is positive in 13 of the 16 emerging
markets in the dataset (significantly so in six of these) and is never significantly coun-
tercyclical. This difference in cyclicality, with the volatility of debt flows countercyclical
and the volatility of equity flows acyclical or procyclical, leads me to focus on the specific
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properties of short-term debt flows, in particular, their potential to generate maturity
mismatch.
Figure 1.3: Cyclicality of Portfolio Capital Flow Volatility,
Equity and Debt Flows to Emerging Markets
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The two novel empirical facts discussed in this section motivate my focus on capital flow
volatility and maturity mismatch. In emerging markets portfolio capital flow volatil-
ity leads the business cycle in a countercyclical manner, while in advanced economies
volatility is uncorrelated with output. This leads me to focus on changes in the volatil-
ity of portfolio capital flows as a potential contributor to business cycle fluctuations in
emerging economies. The data presented also indicate that portfolio debt flows are more
volatile than equity, and that their volatility is more countercyclical. Because a key dif-
ference between equity and debt financing is that only the latter can generate maturity
mismatch, I look to such mismatch as a potential channel through which capital flow
volatility impacts the growth performance of emerging markets.
1.3 Model
In this section I develop a model that captures key features of emerging market economies.
Entrepreneurs borrow from abroad to finance domestic investment. In particular, they
have the opportunity to invest in high-yielding long-term projects that can be prema-
turely terminated, but such liquidation yields a net return of at most zero. Credit mar-
kets are imperfect in two respects. First, agents’ borrowing is restricted to one-period
riskless bonds, so that firms cannot issue equity or long-term debt. This reflects the
well-documented fact that financial markets in emerging economies are underdeveloped,
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forcing firms to rely disproportionately on short-term debt (IMF, 2005; Schmukler and
Vesperoni, 2006; Fan et al., 2012).
Second, firms are subject to an exogenously determined borrowing constraint. The bor-
rowing constraint is stochastic, so that entrepreneurs are uncertain about how much
they will be able to borrow in the future. This uncertainty corresponds to the capital
flow volatility documented in the previous section. The exogenous constraint is realistic
in light of substantial recent work showing that so-called push factors in the advanced
economies play a far greater role than pull factors in recipient countries in determining
the pattern of international capital flows.12
In the remainder of this section, I first develop a model in which entrepreneurs may
only invest in a long-term, linear technology. The simplified model makes clear the
mechanism by which increased uncertainty about the availability of financing depresses
long-term investment. I then introduce a richer version of the model, in which firms
invest in a portfolio of long- and short-term projects with standard concave production
functions. In this full model, increases in capital flow volatility will not only reduce
aggregate investment but also shift the composition of investment away from long-term
projects and towards short-term projects, resulting in lower aggregate TFP.
1.3.1 A Model of Long-Term Investment
I consider a small open economy populated by identical risk-neutral entrepreneurs who
live for three periods. In the initial period (t = 0), entrepreneurs have the opportunity
to invest in projects which yield gross return R after two periods (time-to-build). In the
intermediate period (t = 1), entrepreneurs can choose to liquidate a portion L1 of the
long-term investment, with capital goods converted back into consumption goods one-
for-one, so that investment is fully reversible.13 Firms finance these investments using
an exogenous endowment y0 and by issuing a quantity D1 of non-state-contingent, one-
period bonds on international capital markets at an exogenously determined interest rate
(r). The return on domestic projects is sufficiently high that financing investment with
debt is profitable if the project reaches maturity (R > (1 + r)2). Again, the divergence
in the maturity of firms’ projects and their liabilities captures the pervasive maturity
12The evidence comes not only from research on the macro-level determinants of capital flows (Forbes
and Warnock, 2012a; Fratzscher, 2011) and liquidity conditions (Gonza´lez-Rozada and Levy-Yeyati,
2008; Foley-Fisher and Guimaraes, 2012; Edwards, 2012), but also from empirical finance research on
the portfolio allocations of institutional investors holding assets in emerging markets Didier et al. (2010);
Jotikasthira et al. (2011).
13Introducing partial irreversibility is straightforward and increases the impact of uncertainty shocks
in the model.
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mismatch in emerging markets. In these economies, long-term debt and equity financing
are prohibitively expensive for most firms.
In what follows I abstract from any interest rate uncertainty. The full model presented
in Section 1.3.2 is virtually identical to a model in which firms are initially uncertain
about the interest rate on borrowing at t = 1.14 In the latter case, firms would partially
liquidate their long-term projects when the cost of new borrowing in the intermediate
period exceeded the long-term projects’ marginal product of capital. The mechanism
emphasized in this section remains the same, in that firms’ borrowing and investment in
long-term projects determines their exposure to rollover risk.
When deciding how much to borrow and invest at time t = 0, entrepreneurs face un-
certainty regarding κ2, the quantity of credit that will be available at time t = 1. This
stochastic borrowing constraint has distribution κ2 ∼ F (κ). As a result of this uncer-
tainty, when the entrepreneur borrows in order to invest in the long-term technology he
runs the risk that he will be unable to roll over his debts, forcing him to partially liquidate
the project.
Entrepreneurs thus maximize the discounted sum of dividends:
max
I0,D1,D2,L1
d0 + βd1 + β
2d2 (1.1)
where
d0 = y0 +D1 − I0 (1.2)
d1 = y1 +D2 + L1 − (1 + r)D1 (1.3)
d2 = y2 +R(I0 − L1)− (1 + r)D2 (1.4)
and yt are exogenous endowments. In addition to the borrowing constraint (D2 ≤ κ2),
the firm is subject to a non-negativity constraint on dividends (dt ≥ 0 ∀t = {0, 1, 2}).
This means that the firm cannot issue equity—a realistic assumption in the context of
emerging economies. The firm’s choice of liquidation must be feasible, so that it cannot
be greater than the total quantity invested (L1 ≤ I0). Nor can liquidation be negative
(L1 ≤ I0), which means the firm cannot expand the scale of projects once they have been
initiated.15
I abstract from default risk and assume that creditors will never lend the entrepreneur
more than he can feasibly pay back. Thus the entrepreneur’s borrowing is also subject to
14Chari et al. (2005) make a similar point regarding the mapping between interest rate fluctuations
and quantity constraints in the context of DSGE models of small open economies.
15This assumtion captures the fact that managers cannot dramatically increase the size of an invest-
ment project without seeking new financing and significantly extending the project’s timeline.
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two solvency constraints, which I discuss in detail in the Mathematical Appendix to this
chapter (Appendix B). Importantly, the solvency constraints are not so tight as to prevent
the entrepreneur from borrowing an amount large enough that he risks being forced to
prematurely liquidate part of his long-term project. Moreover, for realistic values for the
world interest rate and for the return on long-term projects, these solvency constraints
will not bind in the neighborhood of the solution to the entrepreneur’s problem.
The entrepreneur will choose investment to equate the shadow value of resources in the
initial period (1+λ0, where λt is the Lagrange multiplier on the non-negativity constraint
on dividends) with the discounted return on the long-term project,
1 + λ0 = β
2RE0[1 + λ2] + βE[ζ
(2)
1 ], (1.5)
where ζ
(2)
1 is the Lagrange multipliers on the upper bound on liquidation (L1 ≤ I0). The
second term on the right-hand side of (1.5) captures the fact that resources used for
long-term investment can also be accessed in the intermediate period through liquida-
tion. Optimal borrowing is set according to an Euler equation, subject to the borrowing
constraint in the second period, with µ1 the multiplier on this constraint:
1 + λ0 = β(1 + r)E0[1 + λ1] (1.6)
1 + λ1 = β(1 + r)(1 + λ2) + µ1. (1.7)
The first order condition for the liquidation of long term projects is
(1 + λ1) + ζ
(1)
1 = βR(1 + λ2) + ζ
(2)
1 (1.8)
where ζ
(1)
1 is the Lagrange multiplier on the non-negativity constraint on liquidation. The
non-negativity constraint is binding when entrepreneurs have additional borrowing ca-
pacity available after rolling over their debts in the intermediate period. They would like
to expand the scale of their long-term projects, which corresponds to negative liquidation,
but are unable to do so.
The profitability of long-term projects means that entrepreneurs are better off investing
and deferring consumption until those projects mature. Firms will therefore never pay
dividends in the first period (d0 = 0). Nor will they issue dividends in the second period,
due to the cost of capital and the presence of the borrowing constraint. Thus firms will
pay dividends only in the final period (for a proof of this, see Section B.2 of Appendix
B).
Since long-term projects have a higher return than bonds, it will never be optimal to
liquidate when the borrowing constraint does not bind (see the proof of Proposition
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B.2.3 in the Appendix B). With both dividends and liquidation set to zero, from the
budget constraint (1.3) it is clear that when the borrowing constraint does not bind, the
entrepreneur borrows exactly the amount needed to cover his outstanding obligations:
D2 = (1 + r)D1 − y1. In this case, the entrepreneur’s final period consumption will be
equal to net profits on long-term investment, along with the final-period value of his
endowments.
CH = [R− (1 + r)2]D2 + [Ry0 + (1 + r)y1 + y2]. (1.9)
Since uninterrupted projects are profitable (R > (1 + r)2), higher initial borrowing trans-
lates into greater consumption in states in which the second-period borrowing constraint
does not bind.
Agents use second-period borrowing only to roll over debt. As a result, the borrowing con-
straint will bind when the borrowing available at t = 1 combined with the entrepreneur’s
t = 1 endowment is less than his debt service payments: κ2 + y1 ≤ (1 + r)D1.
When the borrowing constraint does bind, it will be the case that D2 = κ2. Since no
dividends are paid at t = 1, the budget constraint (1.3) makes clear that the entrepreneur
will liquidate a portion L1 ∈ [0, I0] of the long-term project in order to service his debts.
In particular, he will liquidate just enough of his investment to repay his first period
borrowing: L1 = (1 + r)D1 − (y1 + κ2) (for a proof, see Proposition B.2.4 in Appendix
B). In this case, final period consumption is given by
CL = R(I0 − L1)− (1 + r)κ2 + y2
= [R− (1 + r)]κ2 − rRD1 + [Ry0 +Ry1 + y2] (1.10)
The conditions for optimal borrowing (1.7) and liquidation (1.8), along with the results
discussed above, give
µt = β(1 + r)
[
R
1 + r
− 1
]
(1 + λ2).
This illustrates that when the borrowing constraint binds (µt > 0), firms carry out
liquidation that appears inefficient, in that the present value of allowing the project to
mature is R/(1 + r) > 1 while liquidating yields a gross return of one. However, this
liquidation is in fact an optimal response to the capital market imperfections present in
the economy.
Optimal Borrowing
Once the uncertainty regarding the t = 2 borrowing constraint has been resolved, the
entrepreneur’s decisions are mechanical. The key decision is therefore the choice of initial
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borrowing, and the entrepreneur’s problem reduces to
max
D1
[1− F (κ)]E0[CH |κ2 > κ] + F (κ)E0[CL|κ2 < κ] (1.11)
where κ = (1+r)D1−y1 is the level below which the borrowing constraint binds. Thus the
probability that the constraint will bind is endogenously determined by the entrepreneur’s
choice of initial borrowing, because κ is a function of D1. The more he borrows, the
more likely it is that he will be unable to roll over the debt in the intermediate period.
Substituting using (1.9) and (1.10) into the simplified objective function (1.11) gives
max
D1
[1− F (κ)]{[R− (1 + r)2]D1 + [Ry0 + (1 + r)y1 + y2]} (1.12)
+
∫ κ
−∞
{[R− (1 + r)]κ2 − rRD1 + [Ry0 +Ry1 + y2]} dF (κ2)
This expression makes clear that when the borrowing constraint does not bind (on the
first line of 1.12), the more the entrepreneur has borrowed, the larger will be his final-
period consumption. When the borrowing constraint binds, greater borrowing reduces
consumption by forcing the entrepreneur to liquidate a larger share of the long-term
project. The level of the borrowing constraint will affect the return on investment only
when it binds (κ2 appears only in the second line of 1.12). I show in the next section
that this asymmetry, along with endogeneity of the entrepreur’s exposure to rollover risk,
means that symmetric changes in the distribution of κ2 will affect the expected return
on long-term investments.
The first order condition for the entrepreneur’s borrowing is
[1− F (κ)][R− (1 + r)2]− CHf(κ) ∂κ
∂D1
(1.13)
= F (κ)rR− CLf(κ) ∂κ
∂D1
Intuitively, the entrepreneur chooses the level of debt-financed investment which equal-
izes the expected marginal returns across the two types of states—those in which the
borrowing constraint binds and those in which it does not. Since CH = CL when κ2 = κ,
the second terms on each side of this equation cancel. Simplifying gives:
F (κ) =
R− (1 + r)2
R (1 + r)− (1 + r)2 (1.14)
Since κ = (1 + r)D1 − y1, this pins down the optimal level of borrowing and thus initial
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investment.16 In what follows, I refer to the term on the right-hand side of (1.14), which
will lie between zero and one, as Ψ. As one would expect, optimal investment is increasing
in the gross return on long-term investment (R) and decreasing in the cost of capital, the
world interest rate r.
Increased Uncertainty
In order to understand the effects of the fluctuations in capital flow volatility that I
observed in the data, I now examine how increased uncertainty regarding the value of the
second-period borrowing constraint (κ2) affects initial investment and borrowing. More
specifically, I consider a shift in the distribution of borrowing constraints from F (κ) to
a distribution G(κ) which is a mean-preserving spread. In other words, I examine an
increase in risk as defined by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970):
∫ t
0
[G(κ)−F (κ)]dt ≥ 0 ∀t so
that F (κ) second-order stochastic dominates G(κ). This will isolate the impact of greater
uncertainty regarding the borrowing constraint, independent of any changes in the level.
Remembering that κ is increasing in the amount of initial borrowing, equation (1.14)
makes clear that greater uncertainty will reduce investment when the optimal level of
investment lies in a region in which F (κ) < G(κ). Second-order stochastic dominance
ensures that at least one such region exists. For most distributions, to fall in such a region
κ = (1 + r1)D
∗
2 − y2 must lie in the left tail of the distribution. This will be the case for
realistic parameter values for the return on long-term domestic projects and international
interest rates.
When will a mean-preserving spread increase initial borrowing and investment? When
optimal borrowing is high enough that the greater mass in the right tail of the distribution
reduces the probability that the borrowing constraint will bind. This occurs if the spread
between the return on long-term projects (R) and the world interest rate (1+r) is so large
that the entrepreneur finds it optimal to incur very high rollover risk. In this situation,
the reward in situations where he avoids liquidation is sufficiently large to make high
debt the optimal choice even though he will most likely be forced to liquidate. Although
some entrepreneurs may take on a high degree of financial risk in pursuit of very high-
yield projects, in what follows I explore a situation in which excess returns on long-term
projects are modest and firms avoid liquidation in most states of the world.
To illustrate the mechanism at work in the model, I now assume that the borrowing
constraint κ2 has a lognormal distribution and assign the parameter values given in
Table 1.2. The world interest rate is set to match the average real interest rate on
16This is indeed a maximum, as ∂
2E0[C
s]
∂D21
= f(κ)(1+r)[(1+r)2− (1+r)R] < 0 because I am assuming
that long-term investment is profitable and the world interest rate is non-negative.
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Table 1.2: Parameter Values
Symbol Parameter Value Source
1 + r World interest rate 1.05 Mean real interest rate in emerg-
ing markets
R Return on long-term projects 1.11 Term premium on speculative-
grade US corporate debt
E(κ2) Expected Value of borrowing
constraint (%GDP)
0.12 Mean portfolio debt liabilities
in emerging markets (Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti, 2007)
[y0, y1, y2] Endowments [1,0,0] Normalization
foreign borrowing for my sample of 16 emerging markets.17 I set the return on long-term
projects so that the spread between return on long-term projects and the world interest
rate is equal to the average term premium on two-year BB-rated corporate bonds in the
United States over the last 15 years. In a perfect capital market, any term premium
would correspond to differences in returns on projects of different duration. The US is
presumably closest to an ideal financial market. I use the term premium for speculative-
grade bonds since it is the rating of the vast majority of corporates in emerging markets.
I set the expected value of the borrowing constraint so that average borrowing is equal
to the average ratio of net portfolio debt liabilities to GDP in the emerging markets in
my sample over the last 15 years, as reported in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). The
parameter values in Table 1.2 imply that firms liquidate long-term projects seven percent
of the time.
In Figure 1.4 a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of the borrowing constraint
(κ2) increases the variance of foreign borrowing from the observed mean to volatility one
standard deviation above the mean. To maintain the equality in condition (1.14) the
entrepreneur must reduce D1 and thus investment in order to equate G(κ) and Ψ, the
optimal probability of liquidation from the solution to the entrepreneur’s problem (1.14).
Intuitively, when agents borrow short-term to finance long-term investments they face
a trade-off. On the one hand, greater leverage increases their return on equity if the
borrowing constraint does not bind.18 On the other hand, the risks associated with
greater borrowing are twofold. Most obviously, when the borrowing constraint does bind
the rate of return falls since the entrepreneur must liquidate part of the project. The
greater the gap between outstanding liabilities and available borrowing, the lower the
overall return on the investment.
17Following Neumeyer and Perri (2005), I measure the real interest rate on foreign borrowing as the
real US three month T-Bill rate plus the relevant EMBI-G spread. For details on the sample of countries,
see Section 1.2 and Appendix A.
18In the model, the leverage ratio is given by (1 + r)Dt/
∑t
s=0 ys. Return on equity is
[R− (1 + r)2]D1/
∑2
t=0 yt.
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Figure 1.4: Mean-Preserving Spread
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In addition, higher debt increases the entrepreneur’s exposure to rollover risk, boosting
the probability that the borrowing constraint will bind in the second period. Figure
1.4 makes clear that the probability of the borrowing constraint binding, F (κ), depends
on D2. This introduces concavity into the entrepreneur’s objective function, so that
even when agents are risk neutral, in the presence of maturity mismatch second-moment
shocks have first-order effects, and symmetric changes in the distribution of borrowing
constraints affect the entrepreneurs’ chosen investments in long-term projects.
Figure 1.5 graphs optimal investment for the range of portfolio debt flow volatility ob-
served in the emerging market sample. A shift from the minimum volatility observed
in the data (during the 1990s in India and Colombia) to the observed maximum value
(Bulgaria in 2005) reduces investment by around 10 percent of the initial endowment.
Thus, I find that even when the agents making investment decisions are risk neutral, an
increase in uncertainty about the future availability of borrowing will dampen investment
and slow output growth. If agents were risk averse, this effect would be amplified, since
the desire to smooth consumption would provide a further motive—above and beyond the
need to roll over debt—to borrow in the intermediate period. Here I have abstracted from
this effect in order to emphasize the role played by maturity mismatch in transmitting
shocks to capital flow volatility. Moreover, in contrast to the literature on real options
(Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Bloom, 2009), uncertainty affects firms’ investment decisions
even in the absence of any irreversibility. Introducing partial irreversibility into the model
presented here quantitatively strengthens the effect of uncertainty shocks by reducing
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Figure 1.5: Capital Flow Volatility and Optimal Investment
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the expected profits from debt-financed investment in states in which the borrowing
constraint binds.
In order to compare the impact of capital flow volatility in emerging markets with its
effects in advanced economies, I now compare the above result to a situation in which
the entrepreneur does not face maturity mismatch. This means that in the initial pe-
riod (t = 0), he can issue debt (DL2 ) with the same maturity as his investments, but
faces uncertainty regarding the productivity of his investment. In this case, his problem
becomes:
max
DL2
E0[(R− (1 + rL))DL2 ]
Where 1 + rL is the interest rate on long-term bonds issued by the entrepreneur. With
no interest rate uncertainty, this is simply:
max
DL2
[E0[R]− (1 + rL)]DL2
If the expected return on the investment exceeds the cost of capital, the entrepreneur will
borrow up to the solvency constraint (B.2). If I assume (as in Rothschild and Stiglitz
1970) that κmin2 = 0, or that the support of κ2 is the entire real line, a mean-preserving
spread will leave the solvency constraint unaffected and thus have no effect on investment.
The comparison case without maturity mismatch demonstrates why the interaction be-
tween this common feature of emerging markets and volatile capital flows can help to
explain their greater output volatility. Where firms cannot borrow long-term when fi-
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nancing long-term projects, changes in capital flow volatility will affect the investment and
output. Firms in countries with well-developed capital markets can issue long-term debt,
and therefore will not alter their investment in response to changes in the uncertainty
regarding the future availability of borrowing. By contrast models relying on risk aversion
(Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al., 2011) or irreversible investment (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994;
Bloom, 2009) are not capable of generating a different response to uncertainty shocks
in emerging markets, since neither risk aversion nor irreversibility is different in these
countries as compared to advanced economies.
1.3.2 Full Model
I now consider a richer specification, in which the entrepreneur has the opportunity
to invest in both a standard technology with the production function yst = f(I
s
t−1),
which takes one period to mature, and a long-term technology with production function
yL2 = zf(I
L
0 − L1), which takes two periods to mature. Long-term projects can be
liquidated with a gross return φ ≤ 1, so that investment may be partially irreversible,
although the results remain qualitatively the same regardless of any irreversibility. The
long-term technology is more productive than the short-term technology, so that z ≥ 1
(for simplicity I normalize the productivity of the short-term technology to one). For
both technologies, f ′() > 0 and f ′′() < 0.
As before the firm operates for three periods under the management of a risk neutral
entrepreneur. Thus, this firm will maximize the discounted sum of dividends:
max
IL0 ,D1,D2,I
S
0 ,I
S
1 ,L1
E0
2∑
t=0
βtdt (1.15)
where dividends are given by
d0 = y0 +D1 − IL0 − IS0
d1 = y1 + f
(
IS0
)
+ φL1 +D2 − (1 + r0)D1 − IS1
d2 = y2 + zf
(
IL0 − L1
)
+ f
(
IS1
)− C2 − (1 + r1)D2
and subject to non-negativity constraints (dt ≥ 0 ∀t = {0, 1, 2}). Now in addition to
choosing initial-period borrowing and investment, the firm optimizes over short-term
investment in both the first and second periods.
Apart from the different menu of production technologies, the model is the same as in
the previous section. The firm’s borrowing in the intermediate period is again subject to
an exogenous borrowing constraint (D2 ≤ κ2), the value of which becomes known at time
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t = 1 and which is drawn from a distribution F (κ). Any liquidation carried out while
the long-term investment is gestating is subject to a non-negativity constraint (L1 ≥ 0)
and an upper bound (L1 ≤ I0).
The conditions for optimal borrowing remain (1.6) and (1.7), since the financial side of
the model is the same as in the simplified model. Although the condition for optimal long-
term investment is similar to equation (1.5), the marginal return on long-term investment
now depends on the amount of liquidation that the firm expects to carry out during the
project’s gestation period:
(1 + λ0) = β
2E0
[
zf ′(IL0 − L1)(1 + λ2)
]
+ E0[ζ
(2)
1 ], (1.16)
where the Lagrange multipliers are defined as in the previous section. In this regard, equa-
tion (1.16) differs from the simple model where rollover risk entered the entrepreneur’s
optimization problem only through the Euler equation and did not affect marginal rates
of return.
Apart from the more realistic production technology, the other difference from the model
in the previous section is that the firm can also produce using a short-term technology that
is less productive. The firm initially choses short-term investment so that its marginal
return equals the cost of capital, as is standard (subject to the feasibility constraints):
(1 + r) = f ′(Is0). (1.17)
The second-period choice of short-term investment will depend on whether or not the
borrowing constraint binds:
(1 + r) = f ′(Is1) +
µ1
β
. (1.18)
When the borrowing constraint binds the return on short-term projects will exceed the
cost of capital, since the firm’s investment is limited by the scarcity of external financing.
At the same time, the firm will choose short-term investment to equate its marginal
return with the return on any liquidated long-term investment:
φf ′(Is1)(1 + λ2) + ζ
(1)
1 = zf
′(IL0 − L1)(1 + λ2) + ζ(2)1 . (1.19)
I solve this system numerically using the parameter values in Table 1.2 and setting the
wedge in productivity between short- and long-term projects (z) to 3. I choose the
functional form f(k) = kα and set α = 0.3 as is standard.
As was the case in the simplified model, liquidation and intermediate-period borrowing
are functions of initial borrowing and investment, so that in principle I need only solve
(1.16) taking this into account. However, because of the non-linearities in the full model,
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I cannot do this analytically. Rather, I find the solution to (1.16) by searching over a grid
if values for long-term investment (IL0 ). For each gridpoint, I calculate the optimal levels
of liquidation and t = 1 short-term investment, then impose the non-negativity constraint
on liquidation. For a grid of values for κ2 approximating the lognormal distribution, I
check whether the borrowing constraint will bind. I then recalculate optimal liquidation
and short-term investment for states in which the borrowing constraint binds. After
calculating the values of the Lagrange multipliers in each state, I evaluate the two sides
of (1.16).
Figure 1.6: The Composition Effect of Capital Flow Volatility
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Changes in uncertainty regarding the future availability of borrowing affect aggregate
investment, as was the case in the simplified model, but also the composition of investment
and aggregate productivity. As in the simplified model, uncertainty shocks cause firms
to scale back their long-term investments. Short-term investment remains unaffected,
however, since it does not generate rollover risk. Aggregate investment will therefore fall,
since the reduction in long-term investment is not offset by an increase in short-term
investment. At the same time, the share of investment allocated to long-term project
falls, as Figure 1.6(a) makes clear.
In turn, the change in the composition of investment reduces aggregate productivity.
Economists generally calculate aggregate TFP using data on total output, which is given
by Y2 = z(I
L
0 )
α + (IS1 )
α in the model; aggregate capital stock, which is K2 = I
L
0 +I
S
1 ; and
employment, which is normalized to one. Aggregate TFP in the model is therefore given
by zˆ = Y2
Kα2
. Figure 1.6(b) plots the level of aggregate TFP associated with varying levels
of uncertainty. When higher uncertainty prompts entrepreneurs to reallocate investment
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towards short-term projects, aggregate TFP falls because long-term projects are more
productive.
This mechanism at work in the model offers an explanation for the greater volatility of
output and TFP in emerging markets and for the skewed distribution of growth rates.
Shocks to capital flow volatility affect both advanced economies and emerging markets;
however, those shocks will affect the macroeconomy only when maturity mismatch is
widespread. Sudden stops in capital inflows directly affect the economy by reducing the
availability of financing in the current period, but also increase agents’ uncertainty about
the level of financing that will be available in the future. The model that I have presented
indicates that the uncertainty shock will amplify the impact of the sudden stop. A spike
in the availability of foreign capital will also increase uncertainty. As a result, the direct
benefits of more abundant foreign financing will be offset by the negative effect of the
accompanying rise in uncertainty. This asymmetric amplification helps to explain the
observed asymmetry in growth rates in emerging economies.
1.4 Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that the high output volatility and negatively skewed
growth rates observed in emerging markets can be understood as an effect of shocks to
capital flow volatility in economies where maturity mismatch is widespread. Small open
economies, both advanced and emerging, face uncertainty regarding the future availability
of foreign financing. However, the uncertainty will affect investment only where financial
markets are not well developed and firms are forced to finance investment in long-term
projects with short-term borrowing. An increase in uncertainty about the availability
of foreign borrowing increases firms’ exposure to rollover risk and reduces the expected
return on long-term investment in states of the world in which firms are forced to liquidate
long-term projects. As a result, greater uncertainty not only prompts a reduction in the
level of aggregate investment, but also shifts its composition away from more productive
long-term projects towards short-term projects which do not entail rollover risk. This
composition effect generates endogenous fluctuations in aggregate TFP, increasing its
volatility.
The interaction between capital flow volatility and maturity mismatch amplifies the im-
pacts of fluctuations in capital inflows in an asymmetric way and thereby contributes to
the skewed pattern of growth rates in emerging economies. Sudden stops increase uncer-
tainty about the future availability of foreign capital. Through the mechanism modeled in
this paper, that uncertainty amplifies the negative effects of sudden stops. On the other
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hand, surges in capital inflows also boost uncertainty, which will dampen the positive
effects of such surges on investment and growth.
In advanced economies where firms can finance long-term investment by issuing equity
or long-term debt, uncertainty shocks will not affect investment because firms to not
face rollover risk. Thus changes in capital flow volatility will boost the volatility of
investment, output, and aggregate productivity only in emerging markets. Models in
which uncertainty affects investment because of risk aversion (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al.,
2011) or the irreversibility of investment (Bloom, 2009) are not suited to explaining
differences between advanced and emerging economies, since these features do not vary
systematically between the two groups.
In order to mitigate the risks associated with openness to international capital flows, many
governments have imposed capital controls to limit exposure to capital flow volatility.
Since in the model developed in this paper firms’ investment decisions are constrained
efficient, capital controls will reduce welfare. The reduction in volatility comes at the cost
of lower investment and output. Moreover, substantial evidence indicates that greater
openness to international capital flows promotes financial development (Chinn and Ito,
2006; Baltagi et al., 2009; Caldero´n and Kubota, 2009). As a result, capital controls slow
the deepening of equity markets and the lengthening of corporate yield curves that reduce
the economy’s vulnerability to volatility shocks by preventing maturity mismatch.
There is an obvious role for policy in mitigating the underlying financial frictions that
prevent firms from financing long-term projects by issuing equity or long-term debt.
However, financial market development entails institutional changes that take time to
implement. More immediately, governments have sought to self-insure through the ac-
cumulation official reserves. To the extent that the authorities can credibly commit to
provide liquidity to firms during sudden stop episodes, and thus mitigate rollover risk, this
policy could be welfare enhancing. Such a policy would reduce the uncertainty regard-
ing the future availability of financing and thus limit vulnerability to volatility shocks.
However, accumulating reserves reduces the funds available for investment in productive
projects, and thus entails a cost. I plan to explore this trade-off in future work.
38
Chapter 2
Capital Flow Volatility and Maturity
Mismatch: An Empirical Analysis
2.1 Introduction
Between 2000 and 2010, annual capital flows to emerging markets grew more than five-
fold, from 200 billion dollars to over one trillion dollars, a level they have maintained for
the past two years (WEO, 2011). Although this surge was accompanied by strong growth
performance in recipient economies, policy-makers both in emerging market governments
and international financial institutions have reacted with concern. Major emerging mar-
kets including Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia, and Korea introduced new capital controls,
while the IMF endorsed the use of capital controls as a necessary part of governments’
policy toolbox (Ostry et al., 2010; WEO, 2011). However, the measures adopted and
the policy prescriptions of the IMF did not constitute a return to the blanket capital
controls in place in most countries prior to 1990. Rather, they targeted portfolio capital
inflows, often referred to as hot money. In justifying these measures, policy-makers have
frequently cited the volatility of portfolio flows as a major downside of this source of
external funds. Doubts about the benefits of portfolio flows find support in the academic
literature on the benefits of openness to international capital flows, which consistently
found that these flows little if any positive effect on growth and has often mentioned
volatility as possible explanation for this finding (Caldero´n and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2003;
Mody and Murshid, 2005; Aizenman and Sushko, 2011).
This paper examines in detail the relationship between the volatility of portfolio capital
flows and economic performance, with particular focus on the channel through which
changes in volatility affect investment and output. I verify that the unconditional negative
correlation between portfolio capital flow volatility and output documented in Section
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1.2 remains once I control the level of capital inflows and other determinants of growth.
Guided by the model presented in Chapter 1, I then show the relationship between
portfolio captial flow volatiltiy is consistent with a role for maturity mismatch acting as
a channel of transmission.
I begin my analysis by showing that the volatility of portfolio capital flows dampens
growth by reducing investment, while the level of portfolio flows is positively related to
output and investment in a panel of 16 emerging market economies. This result helps
to explain the common empirical finding that foreign direct investment (FDI) benefits
growth while portfolio flows have no effect or even reduce growth (Caldero´n and Schmidt-
Hebbel, 2003; Mody and Murshid, 2005; Aizenman and Sushko, 2011). Once I condition
on the volatility of portfolio flows, they too are beneficial. I then show that capital flow
volatility has no significant relationship with output and investment in a panel of 11 small
open advanced economies, despite the fact that capital flow volatility is larger relative to
the size of the economy in this sample than in emerging markets.
In order to test whether the relationship between capital flow volatility and output is
consistent with maturity mismatch acting as a transmission mechanism, I first separate
portfolio capital flows into into their equity and debt components. I do this because
short-term debt flows can generate maturity mismatch, while equity flows cannot not.
Consistent with a maturity mismatch channel, I find that the volatility of debt flows
dampens investment, while the volatility of equity inflows has no significant impact.
Second, I compare the effects of capital flow volatility on investment in economies with
different levels of financial development. Recent empirical work has shown that the extent
of maturity mismatch in an economy is highly correlated with widely used measures of
financial development (Schmukler and Vesperoni, 2006; Fan et al., 2012). I therefore use
measures of financial development, equity market capitalization and private credit, as a
proxies for maturity mismatch in the economies in my sample. I find that the negative
impact of capital flow volatility is greater where financial markets are less developed—
precisely those economies where maturity mismatch is most widespread.
My final test of how maturity mismatch affects the relationship between capital flow
volatility and investment makes use of industry-level variation in the duration of invest-
ment projects. Using the methodology developed by Rajan and Zingales (1998), I take
US data on average time-to-build as indicative of the underlying technological features
of each industry. Consistent with a role for maturity mismatch in transmitting volatility
shocks, I find that capital flow volatility has a larger negative impact on industries with
longer average project durations. In industries with the shortest time-to-build, which is
just over one year in the US, capital flow volatility has essentially no negative effect on
investment, while the effect on industries with project durations of two years or more is
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substantial.
My results show a robust negative relationship between the volatility of portfolio capital
inflows and both output and investment. Several aspects of this relationship are consistent
with a role for maturity mismatch as a channel through which shocks to capital flow
volatility affect investment and output. The results therefore have ambiguous implications
for the policy of imposing controls on portfolio capital inflows. On the one hand, such
measures do dampen volatility, which my findings show will boost growth. At the same
time, the impact of capital flow volatility is amplified by underdeveloped financial markets
that force firms to engage in maturity mismatch. Policies to deepen capital markets are
therefore a necessary compliment to any capital controls. However, research has shown
that reduced openness to capital inflows slows financial development (Klein and Olivei,
2008; Baltagi et al., 2009). Thus capital controls may in fact prolong the time necessary to
build the type of capital market infrastructure that ensures that the advanced economies
studies in this paper are unaffected by capital flow volatility.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 examines the relationship between capital
flows, their volatility, and economic performance in using macro-level data and discusses
the extent to which the findings are consistent with the predictions of the model presented
in Chapter 1. In Section 2.3 I use industry-level data to further test whether the data
suggest a role for maturity mismatch in transmitting shocks to capital flow volatility.
Section 2.4 concludes and discusses directions for further research.
2.1.1 Related Literature
This paper contributes to the large literature on the costs and benefits of openness to in-
ternational capital flows (for a survey, see Henry, 2007). Research comparing the relative
benefits of different types of international capital flows has consistently found that FDI
boosts growth while portfolio flows have no effect or even dampen growth (Caldero´n and
Schmidt-Hebbel, 2003; Mody and Murshid, 2005; Aizenman and Sushko, 2011). These
and other papers often cite the volatility of portfolio capital flows as an explanation for
their findings but do not explicitly test the hypothesis that the volatility of portfolio
capital flows offsets their benefits, which this paper does.
Research that does explicitly analyze the relationship has used annual capital flow data
(Knill, 2005; Lensink and Morrissey, 2006; Alfaro et al., 2007; Rancie`re et al., 2008; Broner
and Rigobon, 2011; Broner et al., 2013). The resulting measures of capital flow volatility
describe ten- or twenty-year periods and capture little if any of the variation in capital
flow volatility over time. By obtaining monthly balance of payments data directly from
central banks and financial market regulators, I am able to measure capital flow volatility
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on a quarterly basis and to study the effects of the changes in capital flow volatility over
time evident in Figure 1.1.
In evaluating the extent to which the observed relationship between capital flow volatility
and economic performance is consistent with a role for maturity mismatch as a trans-
mission mechanism, this paper also contributes to research into the effects of maturity
mismatch. Work in this area has tested whether the financial crises more negatively affect
investment in firms with large short-term liabilities (Bleakley and Cowan, 2010; Kalemli-
Ozcan et al., 2010),1 and whether greater exposure to short-term liabilities increased
firms likelihood of bankruptcy (Benmelech and Dvir, 2011; Kim et al., 2012).
This paper contributes to the literature on maturity mismatch in two ways. First, to
my knowledge this my work is the first to empirically examine how maturity mismatch
alters the response of investment and output to second-moments shocks as opposed to
first moment shocks. Previous research on the vulnerabilities generated by maturity
mismatch examines how it affects firms’ or economies’ respond to a cutoff in funding,
whereas this paper examine how the uncertainty generated by the possibility of a sudden
stop or credit crunch affects firms behavior. Second, whereas the papers discussed in
the the previous paragraph study how maturity mismatch affects investment and output
during severe crisis episodes, my work also examines the effects of maturity mismatch
during tranquil times as well as during crises.
2.2 Evidence from Macro Data
The unconditional relationship between output and capital flow volatility motivated the
the model developed in Chapter 1. Here, I test the specific predictions of the model
regarding the relationship between output and investment, on the one hand, and the
uncertainty regarding future financial generated by capital flow volatility. The specific
focus on changes in the level of financial uncertainty motivates me to modify slightly
my measure of capital flow volatility. For each country in my sample, I estimate an
autoregressive model of the following form
flowi,m = ρ0,i + ρ1,iflowi,m−1 + ei,m, (2.1)
1More specifically, by comparing foreign- and domestically owned firms, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2010)
demonstrate that inability to roll over short-term debt depresses investment in the aftermath of crises
in six Latin American countries. Bleakley and Cowan (2010) come to the opposite conclusion based on
a study of firms in 15 emerging markets. They find that the ratio of current liabilities to current assets
has no significant effect on firms’ investment response to sudden stop episodes.
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where flowi,m is gross capital inflows to country i in month m. I then take as a measure
of the uncertainty regarding future capital inflows in month m the backward-looking
12-month standard deviation of the residual ei,m,
V oli,m =
√
1
12
∑11
j=0 ê
2
i,m−j
Trend GDPi,m
. (2.2)
As in the previous chapter, I normalize the volatility by trend GDP for the quarter in
which month m falls in order to capture the importance of volatility relative to the size
of the economy.
Table 2.1 presents the AR coefficients (ρ1,i in equation 2.1) for the 21 economies for which
I have data, for total gross portfolio inflows as well as for gross portfolio equity and debt
inflows separately. The results in Table 2.1 indicate that all coefficients fall well below
unity. This is confirmed by Dickey-Fuller tests (the results of which are not shown). For
approximately 60 percent of the countries, the AR coefficient is statistically different from
zero, indicating that there is indeed a predictable component of capital inflows which my
use of the AR residuals cleans out. The volatility measure used in in this chapter thus
provides a reasonable approximation of uncertainty about future capital inflows.
The sources of my data on monthly capital flows and the method used to calculate
capital flow volatility are discussed in Chapter 1 and listed in Appendix A. I obtained
quarterly data on the level of capital flows from the IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics
(BoPS). Quarterly data on GDP, investment, and consumer prices come from the IMF’s
International Financial Statistics (IFS). I seasonally adjust output, inflation, and the CPI
using the TRAMO-SEATS algorithm implemented in the Demetra+ software available
from Eurostat. Since all three variables are all non-stationary, I use the deviations of
these variables from their quadratic trends in all regressions.2
I first verify that the relationship between output and capital flow volatility suggested by
the correlations in Section 1.2 remain when conditioning other determinants of growth.
Thus, I begin by estimating the following equation
yi,t = β1Flow i,t−1 + β2Voli ,t−1 +X ′i,tγ + αi + δt + εi,t, (2.3)
Where yi,t is the deviation of log seasonally adjusted GDP from its quadratic trend,
Flowi,t−1 is the level of portfolio capital inflows as a percentage of trend GDP, and V oli,t−1
is the volatility measure defined in equation 2.2. The vector Xi,t includes other relevant
control variables. These include the level of FDI and the so-called other investment flows
(consisting primarily of trade credits and loans) from the balance of payments (both
2All results presented in this section are robust to detrending using an HP filter.
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Table 2.1: Portfolio Capital Flows: Autocorrelation Coefficients
Total Portfolio Portfolio Equity Portfolio Debt
Emerging Markets
Turkey 0.349*** 0.319*** 0.339***
South Africa 0.311*** 0.492*** 0.255***
Brazil 0.448*** 0.269*** 0.362***
Chile 0.300*** 0.204** 0.155*
Colombia -0.351*** -0.359*** 0.0788
Mexico 0.052 0.009 0.166**
India 0.375*** 0.351*** 0.299***
Indonesia – -0.051 –
Korea, Rep. 0.323*** 0.403*** 0.407***
Malaysia – – 0.353***
Philippines 0.136* 0.422*** 0.008
Thailand 0.431*** 0.030 0.618***
Bulgaria -0.012 0.042 -0.003
Czech Republic 0.089 0.074 -0.005
Hungary – 0.358*** –
Poland 0.270*** 0.359*** 0.213***
Advanced Economies
Austria 0.295*** – –
Belgium -0.047 – –
Denmark 0.063 -0.051 0.049
Italy 0.078 0.069 0.165**
Norway -0.132 0.160* -0.149*
Sweden -0.234* -0.037 -0.246**
Canada 0.262*** 0.221*** 0.230***
Finland -0.043 0.166** -0.061
Greece 0.186** – –
Portugal 0.000 0.101 -0.177**
Spain 0.586*** -0.057 0.643***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
normalized by trend GDP), as well as the log deviation of seasonally adjusted consumer
prices from their quadratic trend.3
I include country fixed effects (αi) to control for unobserved cross-country heterogeneity
as well as time fixed effects (δt) to capture common shocks affecting all the countries in
the sample.4 Endogeneity is an obvious concern when estimating (2.3). While the level
and volatility of capital flows in an economy may affect aggregate growth and investment,
economic performance in part determines capital flows. For this reason I lag the regressors
by one quarter.5
The results in regression 1 of Table 2.2 demonstrate that the level of portfolio capital
3I have estimated the model with a more extensive array of control variables, including trade as a
share of GDP, institutional quality, and GDP per capita, but these were not consistently significant and
did little to improve the fit of the model.
4In place of time fixed effects, I also estimated the model using GDP-weighted average of output
growth in the US, European Union, and Japan as an explicit measure of global economic conditions.
The results were nearly identical.
5Results presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 are robust to lagging the regressors two, three, and four
quarters.
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Table 2.2: Capital Flow Volatility, Growth, and Investment
Sample: Emerging Markets Advanced Economies
Dependent Variable: GDP1 Investment1 GDP1 Investment1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Portfolio Inflows2 0.161*** 0.571*** -0.006 -0.055
(0.040) (0.157) (0.016) (0.067)
Volatility, Portfolio Inflows3 -0.496*** -1.581*** -0.061 0.107
(0.135) (0.530) (0.074) (0.312)
Net FDI flows2 0.031 0.166 -0.0338 0.038
(0.0287) (0.112) (0.027) (0.112)
Net other flows2 0.173*** 0.600*** -0.007 0.022
(0.022) (0.085) (0.015) (0.062)
Inflation4 0.001 -0.013 -0.633*** -2.187***
(0.003) (0.012) (0.102) (0.429)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 749 749 353 353
R2 0.478 0.384 0.775 0.598
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressors
lagged one quarter. 1Seasonally adjusted, log deviation from quadratic trend.
2% of trend GDP. 312-month trailing standard deviation of AR(1) residuals, % of
trend GDP. 4Consumer prices, seasonally adjusted, log deviation from quadratic
trend. See Appendix A for data sources and list of emerging and advanced
economies included.
flows is indeed significantly associated with higher growth, as is the case for FDI and other
flows. However the volatility of portfolio flows is negatively related to growth. Thus, after
conditioning on other relevant variables, the relationship between capital flow volatility
and output dicussed in Chapter 1 remains.
As a first step towards understanding the mechanism through which capital flow volatility
affects growth I re-estimate (2.3) with investment as the dependent variable. The results
are presented in regression 2 of Table 2.2. Once again, while the level of portfolio capital
inflows is positively related to investment, the volatility of these capital flows offsets this
effect. This suggests that the adverse impact of capital flow volatility on growth is due in
part to a negative relationship with investment, as was the case in the model developed
in Chapter 1.
In regressions 3 and 4 I estimate the model using data on the 11 small open high-income
economies for which I have monthly capital flows data. I find no significant relationship
between the volatility of portfolio capital flows and either output or investment. Not
only are the coefficients on volatility in the right-hand two columns not statistically
different from zero, the point estimates are an order of magnitude smaller than those for
the emerging markets sample. These results suggest that the mechanism through which
capital flow volatility affects output operates in emerging markets but not in advanced
economies.
45
In the model of Section 1.3, capital flow volatility affected investment due to the presence
of maturity mismatch and had no effect where mismatch was not present. Therefore, I
expect that the volatility of capital flows that do not generate maturity mismatch will
not dampen investment. I test this hypothesis in Table 2.3, where I divide portfolio
inflows into its two components—portfolio equity and portfolio debt flows. Portfolio debt
flows contain a mix of both long- and short-term debt, so that a portion of these flows
will not be associated with maturity mismatch on the part of the domestic firms issuing
the debt. However, by definition equity flows can never generate maturity mismatch. I
therefore use this distinction in order to test the prediction of the model in Chapter 1 that
financing that creates maturity mismatch generates a relationship between volatility and
investment. While I imperfectly measure mismatch-generating flows, the contamination
of the portfolio debt flows in my regression with foreign purchases of long-term bonds
will work against my finding results consistent with the model’s predictions.
The results of this exercise, presented in Table 2.3, suggest that the negative effects of
capital flow volatility are indeed restricted to portfolio debt flows, which is significantly
and negatively related to investment in all specifications. By contrast, the coefficient
on equity flow volatility is generally not significantly different from zero and always
much smaller than the coefficient on debt volatility. This is consistent with the model’s
prediction that uncertainty about the future availability of foreign financing dampens
investment in the presence of maturity mismatch, but not when firms are able to fund
themselves with liabilities that do not generate maturity mismatch.
The difference in the coefficients on the volatility of equity and debt in Table 2.3 also help
to rule out a potential alternative explanation for the volatility-investment relationship
I find in the data. Because economic conditions in high-income countries are major
determinants of capital flows to emerging markets, periods of volatile capital inflows often
coincide with periods of economic volatility in the US and Europe. The relationship
observed in Table 2.2 between the volatility of total portfolio inflows and investment
might therefore reflect not maturity mismatch, but rather uncertainty about demand for
exports from the emerging markets in my data set.6 If demand uncertainty rather than
financial uncertainty were driving my results, however, the coefficients on equity and debt
flows should be nearly identical. Both types of flows respond to economic conditions in
high-income countries, so that the volatility of both types of flows capture an element
of demand uncertainty. That the coefficients differ significantly, in both economic and
statistical terms, suggests a channel of transmission other than demand uncertainty is at
work.
Empirical work by Schmukler and Vesperoni (2006) and Fan et al. (2012) demonstrates
6For an overview of the challenges associated with distinguishing the impact of financial shocks from
that of demand shocks, see Amiti and Weinstein (2011).
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Table 2.3: Capital Flow Volatility, Investment,
and Financial Development
Sample: Emerging Markets
Dependent Variable: Investment1 Investment1 Investment1
(1) (2) (3)
Portfolio Equity Inflows2 0.784*** 1.217** 0.202
(0.271) (0.497) (0.696)
Portfolio Debt Inflows2 0.444** 0.606** 0.764**
(0.184) (0.246) (0.298)
Volatility, Equity Inflows3 -0.315 -2.621** -1.477
(0.762) (1.127) (1.125)
Volatility, Debt Inflows3 -3.162*** -4.256*** -6.397***
(0.82) (1.148) (1.557)
Equity Flows*Market Cap2,4 -0.47
(0.396)
Equity Volatility*Market Cap3,4 8.162***
(2.623)
Debt Flows*Market Cap2,4 -0.353
(0.288)
Debt Volatility*Market Cap3,4 3.451*
(2.04)
Equity Flows*Credit2,5 0.697
(0.682)
Equity Volatility*Credit3,5 4.872*
(2.519)
Debt Flows*Credit2,5 -0.827*
(0.428)
Debt Volatility*Credit3,5 7.043**
(2.857)
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 749 749 749
R2 0.393 0.411 0.411
Standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
All regressors lagged one quarter. Additional controls included: net FDI
inflows, net other inflows, inflation, trend market cap or credit (% GDP)
1Seasonally adjusted, log deviation from quadratic trend. 2% of trend GDP.
312-month trailing standard deviation of AR(1) residuals, % of trend GDP.
4Quadratic trend of equity market capitalization, ,% GDP. 5Quadratic trend
of credit the to private sector, % GDP. See Appendix A for data sources and
list of emerging economies included.
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that the extent of maturity mismatch in the economy is closely related to its overall level of
financial development. With this in mind, I employ two widely used measures of financial
development, equity market capitalization and private credit (both as a share of GDP),
as a proxies for the level of maturity mismatch. In particular, I use the quadratic trend
of this variable to capture the underlying structural characteristic that I am interested
in, rather than for example a stock price bubble or credit boom.
The results, in regressions 2 and 3 of Table 2.3, indicate that higher levels of financial
development do indeed reduce the negative effects of portfolio debt flow volatility on
investment. The negative impact of portfolio debt flow volatility is therefore less in
more financially developed economies—those economies in which maturity mismatch is
less severe. These results are consistent with the work of other researchers, including
Alfaro et al. (2004) and Eichengreen et al. (2011), who have demonstrated that financial
development amplifies the benefits associated with capital inflows. Moreover, this finding
is consistent with a role for maturity mismatch in channeling shocks to capital flow
volatility through to the real economy.
2.3 Evidence from Industry-Level Data
The previous section tested the predictions of the model of Chapter 1 regarding the
relationship between financial uncertainty, as captured by capital flow volatility, and
aggregate output and investment. However, the model also has a variety of implication for
the relationship between capital flow volatility and the performance of different industries.
In the model greater uncertainty regarding the future availability of lending induced the
representative firm to cut back on long-term investment while leaving the level of short-
term investment unchanged. As a result, I expect that the financial uncertainty generated
by capital flow volatility will have a larger impact on industries characterized by greater
mismatch between the maturity of their liabilities and the duration of their investment
projects.
In this section, I therefore test whether capital flow volatility has a larger negative impact
on industries with longer project durations, using a methodology based on that devel-
oped by Rajan and Zingales (1998). The Rajan-Zingales approach takes US data on
industry-level characteristics as representative of the underlying technological or struc-
tural features of each industry, then looks at how the impact of a particular variable
varies with those industry-level characteristics. Thus research into the effects of open-
ness to capital flows has examined how firms with different degrees of dependence on
external financing (the industry-level feature employed by Rajan and Zingales) respond
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to capital account liberalization (Gupta and Yuan, 2009; Levchenko et al., 2009), finan-
cial crisis (Kroszner et al., 2007; Tong and Wei, 2011), or fluctuations in capital inflows
(Aizenman and Sushko, 2011). Other studies have employed modified versions of this
technique, exploiting alternate sources of variation across industries such as liquidity
needs (Raddatz, 2006), contract intensity (Nunn, 2007), and schooling intensity (Ciccone
and Papaioannou, 2009). In each case, the authors take variation across industries in the
US as indicative of the sector’s fundamentals.
Here I take industry-level variation in the average time necessary for firms to complete
investment projects in the US as representative of the variation in project duration dic-
tated by industries’ underlying technology and examine how the impact of capital flow
volatility varies across industries which differ in this dimension. My focus on the ma-
turity of investment projects contrasts with many existing empirical studies of maturity
mismatch that rely on data from the liability side of firms’ balance sheets (Schmukler and
Vesperoni, 2006; Bleakley and Cowan, 2010; Fan et al., 2012). Using US project duration
as a proxy for maturity mismatch in a given industry requires that the cross-industry
variation in time-to-build in the US reflects underlying technical features of each indus-
try that are constant across countries. This is the standard assumption made in studies
employing the Rajan-Zingales approach.
In emerging markets where relatively few firms can fund themselves with long-term debt
or equity, project duration clearly provides a reasonble measure of maturity mismatch.
However, even where capital markets are more developed, this variable provides infor-
mation regarding the degree of maturity mismatch in a given industry as long as some
subset of firms in each industry are constrained in their ability to issue long-term debt
and equity, for example small or young firms. In any case, to the extent that firms adjust
their liability structure to reflect the length of time needed for their investments to ma-
ture, my estimates of the impact of project duration on the relationship between capital
flow volatility and investment will be biased towards zero.
Data on the time needed to complete investment projects are relatively rare, particularly
at the industry-level data.7 Models featuring time to build generally demonstrate that
their results are robust to a variety of investment lags (e.g. Bar-Ilan and Strange, 1996)
or choose the project duration to match a calibration target such as the volatility of
investment (e.g. Kydland and Prescott, 1982), rather than basing their parameter choice
on any direct empirical evidence the parameter’s empirical value. An exception is Koeva
(2000), who compiles data on the duration of investment projects undertaken by US
firms in 19 3-digit International Standard Industry Classification (ISIC) manufacturing
industries. These data measure the time elapsed from the initiation of project planning
7For example, in discussing the available evidence on time-to-build, Kydland and Prescott (1982)
cite a paper from 1960 (Mayer, 1960).
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Table 2.4: Average Project Duration by Industry
Duration
ISIC Code Description (months)
355 Rubber products 13
381 Metal products 14
362 Glass and stone products 18
369 Non-metallic mineral products 18
382 Machinery 18
390 Other manufacturing 18
323 Leather products 23
341 Paper products 23
352 Other chemical products 23
353 Petroleum refining 23
354 Petroleum and coal products 23
311 Food products 24
321 Textiles 24
383 Electrical machinery 24
385 Professional and scientific equipment 25
384 Transport equipment 28
331 Wood products 30
371 Iron and steel 37
372 Non-ferrous metals 37
Source: Koeva (2000)
to the time the project came on line. Project lengths in the sample range from just
over a year for the construction of a light manufacturing facility producing metal or
rubber products to more than three years for heavy industry such as mills engaged in the
smelting and rolling of iron and steel (Table 2.4), with the average investment project
taking just over two years to come on line. These findings are consistent with aggregate-
level estimates by Boca et al. (2008) of the average time required for investment projects
to become productive in a panel of approximately 1500 Italian manufacturing firms from
1985 to 1995.
To examine how the impact of capital flow volatility varies across industries with differing
project durations, I estimate the following specification
yi,j,t = β1Flow i,t−1 + β2Voli ,t−1
+ (β3Flow i,t−1 + β2Voli ,t−1 )× Durationj (2.4)
+VA sharei ,j ,t−1 +X ′i,tγ + αi + φj + δt + εi,j,t, .
The dependent variable yi,j,t represents the change in either log real value-added or log
real investment, depending on the specification, in country i for industry j in year t. The
variable Durationj multiplies both the level and the volatility of capital inflows and is
the average project duration for industry j reported by Koeva (2000) measured in years.
As in the previous section, I measure capital flow volatility using the standard deviation
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of the residuals from an AR(1) regression of the level inflows, normalized by trend GDP.
Following the literature, I control the industrial structure of the economy by including
each industry’s share of total value added in the previous year VAshare i,j,t−1, as well as a
vector of country-level control variables Xi,t.
I obtained data on value added and investment at the three-digit ISIC level from IND-
STAT4 datatase maintained by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization
(UNIDO). The UNIDO data are compiled from national industrial surveys that cover
both publicly listed and privately held firms. The inclusion of unlisted firms is important
given that I expect capital flow volatiltiy to have the largest effects on firms unable to
issue equity. The fact that the frequently used Worldscope data base excludes privately
held firms is one reason why I do not follow other researchers (e.g. Schmukler and Ves-
peroni, 2006; Bleakley and Cowan, 2010; Fan et al., 2012) studying maturity mismatch
who use firm-level data from Worldscope.
As the UNIDO data are in nominal terms, I deflate them using the aggregate GDP
deflator (taken from the WDI), as is standard in the literature (e.g. Kroszner et al., 2007;
Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2009; Gupta and Yuan, 2009; Levchenko et al., 2009; Rajan
and Subramanian, 2011).8 Since the use of industry-level data allows me to focus on
the specific mechanism through which volatility affects investment, here I estimate the
model using data not only for the emerging markets in my sample but also the small,
open advanced economies.
Table 2.5 presents the results from estimating equation 2.4. The coefficients on the terms
interacting the level of portfolio debt flows and time-to-build are positive, significantly so
when the dependent variable is investment growth. This implies that debt flows benefit
industries with longer project durations relatively more than those with shorter time-to-
build. Therefore although the coefficient on the level of portfolio debt is significant and
negative, the net impact of these capital flows on investment in industries with longer than
average time-to-build will be positive.9 This result is sensible given the close relationship
between time-to-build, capital intensity, and reliance external financing.
Similarly, while the coefficient on portfolio debt volatility is significant and positive, the
debt volatility-time-to-build interaction term carries a negative and statistically signifi-
cant coefficient. Capital flow volatility more negatively affects industries in which projects
take longer to complete, with the net effect of volatility negative where project durations
8Since industry-level deflators are not available for a broad set of countries, the alternate approach
taken by Koren and Tenreyro (2007) is to use US industry-level deflators. I use the method most widely
used in the literature.
9In the notation of equation 2.4, this net effect is given by β1 + β3 × Durationj . The unweighted
mean value of duration across manufacturing industries is just over two years. Recall, however, that the
data on US time-to-build are not used here as an accurate estimate of industry project durations in the
countries. Rather, they provide a relative ranking of industries according to their time-to-build.
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Table 2.5: Capital Flow Volatility and Project Duration
Sample: Emerging & Advanced Economies
Dependent Variable: Value-Added1 Investment1
(1) (2)
Portfolio Equity Inflows2 -0.0873 -0.217
(1.735) (3.007)
Portfolio Debt Inflows2 -1.809** -3.699***
(0.908) (1.387)
Volatility, Equity Inflows3 -1.889 21.38
(10.13) (15.68)
Volatility, Debt Inflows3 18.08*** 33.78***
(6.576) (9.851)
Equity Flows*Time-to-Build2,4 0.064 0.177
(0.852) (1.464)
Equity Volatility*Time-to-Build2,4 1.444 -4.109
(4.669) (7.137)
Debt Flows*Time-to-Build3,4 0.496 1.698***
(0.432) (0.649)
Debt Volatility*Time-to-Build3,4 -9.083*** -19.45***
(2.934) (4.332)
Value-added Share -1.021*** -0.476
(0.205) (0.325)
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 3202 2347
R2 0.092 0.098
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
All regressors lagged one year. Additional controls included: net FDI
inflows, net other inflows, inflation, GDP per capita. 1Real growth,
year-on-year. 2% of trend GDP. 312-month standard deviation of AR(1)
residuals, % of trend GDP. 4Time-to-build measured in years. See Ap-
pendix A for data sources and a list of emerging and advanced economies
included.
are above average. Why might value-added and investment in industries with relatively
short project durations be positively related to capital flow volatility? This likely reflects
the fact that these industries can more easily take advantage of surges in capital inflows
that occur during periods of high volatility.
The results in Table 2.5 are consistent with maturity mismatch acting as a channel
through which the financial uncertainty generated by capital flow volatility affects in-
vestment and output. The negative and significant coefficient on the interaction between
portfolio debt flow volatility and project duration indicates that industries in which in-
vestments take longer to mature are more negatively affected by volatility. The coefficient
on the interaction between time-to-build and equity flow volatility is not statistically dif-
ferent from zero and changes sign. Once again, this difference in the impact of the two
different types of capital flows also suggests that my estimates of volatility’s effects do
not reflect factors such as demand uncertainty, which would be reflected in both types of
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capital flow volatility.
2.4 Conclusion
Data from a panel of 15 emerging markets and 11 advanced economies are consistent with
a role for maturity mismatch in transmitting uncertainty shocks to capital flow volatility.
In the emerging markets, capital flow volatility is associated with lower growth and
investment, while this relationship does not hold in high-income small open economies.
The volatility of portfolio debt flows, which can generate maturity mismatch, negatively
affects output by dampening investment. By contrast, the volatility of equity flows,
which do not generate maturity mismatch, is not significantly related to either output or
investment. Moreover, the negative impact of portfolio debt flow volatility is mitigated
by financial market development, one component of which is a longer yield curve and
thus less widespread maturity mismatch.
The relationship between capital flow volatility and average project duration observed
at the industry-level is also consistent with a role for maturity mismatch in transmitting
shocks to capital flow volatility to the real economy. Industries in which investment
projects require longer to complete are more negatively affected by increases in capital
flow volatility. In industries where the average project takes only a year to complete,
capital flow volatility has no impact on output or investment.
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Chapter 3
Large Capital Inflows, Sectoral
Allocation, and Economic
Performance 1
3.1 Introduction
The last 30 years have seen a sustained process of financial globalization, with countries
around the world opening their capital account and joining the international financial
markets. With the passing of time, both in academic and policy circles an initially benign
view toward openness to international capital flows has given way to a more skeptical
approach. The IMF’s inclusion of capital controls in its recommended policy toolbox
epitomizes the shift in thinking (Ostry et al., 2010; WEO, 2011). Not only are episodes
of large capital inflows thought to set the stage for subsequent financial crises, but the
impact of inflows on economic performance during tranquil times has also been called
into question, for example in the context of the European Union (Giavazzi and Spaventa,
2010).
Figure 3.1 summarizes the experiences of Spain and Ireland, which are in many ways
typical of the countries in the Eurozone periphery. Since the launch of the Euro, these
countries have received large capital inflows (the first row of Figure 3.1), coinciding with
rapid credit growth and consumption booms (second row). Moreover, these countries
1This chapter is joint work with Luca Fornaro and Dr. Gianluca Benigno The project was originally
motivated by Luca Fornaro’s and Gianluca Benigno’s interest in empirically testing the model they
developed in Benigno and Fornaro (2013). Other than brief passages in the chapter’s introduction, all of
the text was written by me. I carried out all of the empirical work, which I discussed with my co-authors,
who assisted in interpreting results and provided general guidance on the direction of the paper. The
model setup was suggested by Luca Fornaro. I derived all of the analytical results presented in the
chapter.
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experienced a shift of resources out of sectors producing tradable goods such as man-
ufacturing and into the production of non-tradable goods, such as construction (third
row of Figure 3.1). During the same period, the economies in Eurozone periphery saw
a slow down in productivity growth (bottom row of Figure 3.1) . These developments
have led some authors to draw a connection between episodes of large capital inflows
and slowdowns in productivity growth, since capital inflows can trigger a movement of
resource toward non-tradable sectors characterized by slow productivity growth (Benigno
and Fornaro, 2013; Reis, 2013).
The consequences of large capital inflows have also raised concerns among policy-makers
in emerging market economies. In the five years prior to the 2008 financial crisis, capital
flows to these countries averaged 500 billion dollars per year, while after the crisis annual
capital inflows averaged more than one trillion dollars annually. As in the European
periphery, higher capital inflows to emerging markets coincided with consumption booms
and exchange rate appreciation. The surge in inflows, memorably described by Brazilian
President Dilma Rouseff as a “liquidity tsunami,” led governments in countries ranging
from Brazil to Korea to Indonesia to impose controls on capital inflows. More recently,
the output growth in emerging markets has slowed, precisely as capital inflows have
subsided. Once again, this experience raises the question of whether episodes of captial
inflows negatively impact economic perfomance in the medium term.
This paper assesses whether the experience of Eurozone periphery countries represents
an exception or rather the norm. To this end, we examine episodes of large capital
inflows over the last 35 years in a group of 69 middle- and high-income countries. We
find that while these episodes begin with an acceleration of growth, once the capital
inflows subside growth slows significantly and aggregate productivity drops. However,
we also find that the severity of the post-episode downturn is systematically related to
the sectoral allocation of resources during the episode. Episodes in which investment
shifts towards the tradables sector while capital inflows are high exhibit better growth
performance once those inflows subside.
We use a model of a small open economy to interpret our empirical results. In an
economy with two sectors, tradable and nontradable, we show that a permanent shock to
productivity in the tradables sector, a fall in the world interest rate, and an increase in
expected future productivity will all lead to a jump in capital inflows. Whereas the first
of these three shocks will result in a shift of both labor and capital into the tradables
sector, the latter two shocks result in labor moving into the production of notradable
goods while investment shifts into nontradables.
The differences in sectoral allocation of labor across the episodes that we identify in the
data can therefore be interpreted as an indication of the underlying cause of each episode.
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Figure 3.1: Capital Inflows and Macroeconomic Performance
in the Eurozone Periphery
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In turn, the relationship between sectoral allocation of labor while capital inflows are
rising and subsequent economic performance after inflows begin to fall may reflect the
fact that large capital inflows generated by lower international interest rates or expected
productivity gains expose the recipient economy to greater risk than do episodes that
reflect increases in productivity which have already been realized.
Our finding that episodes of large capital inflows are typically followed by an economic
downturn in the medium-term suggests that the concerns of policy-makers in emerging
markets are warranted. Capital inflows that coincide with a shift in labor into the non-
tradables sector merit particular caution. By contrast, where labor moves to the tradables
sector, any downturn that follows the end of large capital inflows is likely to be relatively
mild, thus weakening the case for policy intervention.
The paper begins by describing the data and methodology we use to identify episodes
of large capital inflows in Section 2. In Section 3 we examine how key macroeconomic
variables behave during and after inflows episodes, as well as how the sectoral allocation
of resources changes. We then study the relationship between sectoral allocation dur-
ing inflows episodes and post-episode performance. Section 4 introduces a model of a
small open economy and analyzes the economy’s response to shocks that generate capital
inflows. We then interpret our empirical findings in light of the model’s results. We
discuss possible implications of our findings for policy-makers in countries that receive
large capital inflows in Section 5.
3.1.1 Related Literature
This paper contributes to two areas of literature. First, in focusing on episodes of un-
usually large capital capital inflows, our work is related to the study of what have been
called capital flow bonanzas or surges. Our methodology, taken from the literature on
credit booms (Gourinchas et al., 2001; Tornell and Westermann, 2002; Mendoza and Ter-
rones, 2008), identifies periods in which the level of capital inflows is unusually large.
By contrast, the literature on surges examines the causes (Forbes and Warnock, 2012b)
and consequences (Reinhart and Reinhart, 2009) of unusually large changes in capital
inflows. The experience of Eurozone countries highlights the value of our approach. Cap-
ital inflows to Spain grew steadily, eventually exceeding 10 percent of GDP, but never
jumped as in a surge.
Perhaps the closest paper to this work is Cardarelli et al. (2010), who also examine
episodes in which the level of capital inflows is unusually high. Whereas they focus on
policy responses to large capital inflows, we study the effects of such episodes on the
sectoral allocation of resources. Using a different measure of capital inflows also allows
57
us to examine episodes over a longer timespan. Importantly, our data include the large
capital flows to the Eurozone periphery in the mid-2000s as well as recent capital flows
to emerging markets, while Cardarelli et al. (2010) do not.
Second, our work contributes to research on how external factors interact with the sectoral
allocation of production to affect economic performance. Rodrik (2008) documents that
an undervalued exchange rate boosts economic growth and presents evidence that the
reallocation of resources into the production of tradable goods generates this relationship.
Analyzing the impact of sectoral allocation on aggregate productivity in more detail,
McMillan and Rodrik (2011) show that a shift of productive resources into relatively
less productive sectors have in many countries severely dampened aggregate productivity
growth, even as resource allocation within sectors has improved. Our empirical findings
are consistent with Rodrik’s in that we show that large capital inflows are associated with
both real exchange rate appreciation and a reallocation of resources out of the tradables
sector, as well as a subsequent slowdown in both output and productivity.
Analyzing the experience of Southern Europe, Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010) also highlight
the risks associated with capital inflows that are accompanied by reallocation into the
nontradables sector. This paper takes the analysis further by systematically documenting
the negative relationship between the shift into nontradables during episodes of large
capital inflows and economic performance once those flows abate. Moreover, our model
provides insights into why the pattern of sectoral reallocation differs across episodes.
3.2 Data and Methodology
3.2.1 Identifying Capital Inflows Episodes
As a measure of capital inflows into the economy we use the (negative of the) current
account deficit less the increase in holdings of official reserves. All data on international
capital flows are taken from the IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics (BoPS) data base.
Such a broad measure of capital inflows may seem at odds with recent work on the subject,
which has shown important differences in the behavior of private and public flows (Alfaro
et al., 2011) as well as gross and net flows (Rothenberg and Warnock, 2011b; Forbes and
Warnock, 2012b; Broner et al., 2013). However, our focus here is the impact of capital
flows in recipient countries, meaning that the origins and drivers of those flows is of less
importance for our analysis.
We do subtract reserve accumulation from our measure of capital inflows, however, in
order to be able to differentiate between large capital inflows and the policy response to
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them.2 The case of Brazil highlights the merits of our approach: during the four years
after the 2008 financial crisis, Brazil received approximately 50 billion dollars in capital
inflows, an average of 4.5 percent of GDP per year. At the same time, the country’s
foreign exchange reserves nearly doubled. This accumulation of assets by the monetary
authorities meant that Brazil’s current account deficit averaged only 2.5 percent of GDP
during a time of large capital inflows, much discussed by policy-makers and the media as
well as evident in the data.
Having selected our preferred inflows measure, we normalize by trend GDP in order to
capture the size of the flows relative the economy.3 Using trend GDP deals with the fact
that a surge in capital inflows can boost the size of GDP. We then linearly detrend the
normalized series because we observe in the data that numerous economies exhibit long-
run trends in their current account balances, presumably for varying structural reasons.
Most obviously, the neoclassical growth model predicts that capital-scarce economies will
receive capital inflows that diminish in size as the economy converges to its steady-state
level of capital. A downward trend in capital inflows is also consistent with models of
convergence to a technological frontier (as in Krugman 1979 or Grossman and Helpman
1991). We are not interested in large capital flows that emerge in the course of a long-run
trend, but rather on short- and medium-term jumps in capital inflows that occur along
this transition path in response to shocks. Detrending the series allows us to identify
precisely such events.
In order to identify periods of exceptionally large capital inflows, we follow a proce-
dure commonly used in research on credit booms (Gourinchas et al., 2001; Mendoza and
Terrones, 2008) which has more recently been applied to international capital flows (Car-
darelli et al., 2010; Caballero, 2012). We calculate the long-run standard deviation of our
detrended capital inflows measure for each country and flag years in which inflows rise
more than one standard deviation above their trend.4 These flagged country-years mark
the existence of an episode of large capital inflows. An episode begins when the current
account as a share of GDP first drops more than half a standard deviation below its trend
2Reinhart and Reinhart (2009) describe reserve accumulation less the current account balance as
“the best indicator of capital flows,” but ultimately use the current account balance in order to lengthen
the period covered by their analysis. For an extended discussion of this measure of capital inflows and
a survey of the research using it, see Miao and Pant (2012)
3Specifically, the capital inflows are measured in current US dollars and then normalized by the
trend component of GDP in current US dollars. We extracted the trend component of GDP using a
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter.
4Unlike Gourinchas et al. (2001) and Cardarelli et al. (2010) we take the trend over the entire
sample period, rather than a country-year-specific expanding window tend. This is because our rationale
for detrending differs substantially. Cardarelli et al. (2010) study policy responses to capital inflows
and therefore detrend in order to determine whether contemporary policy-makers would have seen the
inflows as unusually large. We detrend to determine whether the inflows are large relative to the long-run
trajectory of the economy. This difference in motivation makes the long-run trend more appropriate than
an expanding window.
59
level and ends when the current account again comes within half a standard deviation of
its trend.5
Although for some countries balance of payments data extends as far back as the 1940s,
the IMF Balance of Payments data cover substantially fewer countries prior to the early
1970s. We therefore restrict our attention to capital inflows episodes occurring between
1975 and 2010. We exclude from the analysis countries with a population that never
exceeds one million as well as those with annual GDP that remains below one billion
dollars throughout the period we study. This has the virtue of excluding several off-
shore financial centers where the relationship between capital flows and the real economy
differs substantially from the typical economy. We also remove from our dataset ma-
jor oil exporters and countries eligible to receive World Bank International Development
Association (IDA) assistance.6 The main determinants of the external balances of these
groups—oil price movements and donors’ willingness to provide foreign aid, respectively—
play a far smaller role in the dynamics of capital inflows in most other economies.
We experimented with alternate methodologies for identifying episodes in order to verify
that our results were robust to the use of different measures and thresholds. Thus,
we identified episodes using two alternate measures of capital inflows: the raw current
account as a share of GDP and the current account in constant US dollars normalized
by population. We also raised the threshold for identifying episodes from one to 1.5
standard deviations, and lowered the exit and entry threshold from 0.5 to zero. The
results discussed below are robust to these different methodologies.
3.2.2 Other Variables
Having identified episodes of large capital inflows, we are particularly interested in how
these episodes end. Do inflows gradually taper off or do they stop abruptly? Does the
economy experience a hard landing once inflows subside? Following the large literature
on crises and sudden stops, we identify capital flow reversals and sudden stops using
the methodology developed by Calvo et al. (2004).7 In this classification scheme, a
reversal occurs when the year on year change in capital inflows is at least two standard
deviations below the mean. A sudden stop occurs when a reversal coincides with an
output contraction Calvo et al. (2004). We deem a capital inflows episode to coincide
5In the terminology used by Mendoza & Terrones (2008) we set the entry and exit thresholds for the
detrended current account equal to 0.5.
6The main criterion for IDA eligibility is a PPP-adjusted per-capita GDP of less than US $1,195.
The IDA provides grants as well as concessional lending to eligible countries.
7Rothenberg and Warnock (2011b) and Forbes and Warnock (2012b) use this approach to identify
both surges and sudden stops in gross capital flows.
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with a reversal or sudden stop if one of these events occurs at any point during the episode
or in the year immediately after the episode end.
Several authors have suggested a link between aggregate productivity and capital inflows
(Aoki et al., 2010) as well as closely related variables such as the real exchange rate (Ro-
drik, 2008). In order to further explore these links we calculate total factor productivity
(TFP) for a broad sample of countries over an extended time period using data on output
and investment obtained from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 2013). We estimate
initial capital stock using the method described in Klenow and Rodrguez-Clare (1997)
and calculate capital stock for subsequent years using the annual values of investment
obtained from the Penn World Tables. In calculating TFP, we use employment data from
the International Labor Organization’s LABORSTA data set rather than the labor force
data provided by the Penn World Tables. This ensures that fluctuations in TFP around
episodes of large capital inflows are not the result of changes in the unemployment rate.
We calculate aggregate total factor productivity using standard growth accounting (e.g.
as in Benhabib and Spiegel, 2005). This allows us to measure TFP in nearly all of the
69 countries in which we observe episodes of large capital inflows.
Macroeconomic data are from the standard sources, including the IMF International
Financial Statistics (IFS) and the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI).
We also analyze international liquidity conditions at the time of capital inflows episodes,
taking movements of the effective Federal Funds rate, obtained from the Federal Reserve
Economic Database (FRED) as a proxy for changes in the rates attached to international
lending. We calculate real rates by subtracting from the nominal rate inflation during
the previous year, which we use as a proxy for expected inflation. As a measure of the
risk appetite of major international investors, we use the the spread between top-rated
corporate bonds in the US (those rated Aaa by Moody’s) and medium-grade corporate
bonds (rated Baa), which “are subject to substantial credit risk” (Moody’s, 2013).8
We obtain data on manufacturing sector employment, value-added, and investment from
the UNIDO INDSTAT2 database. As the UNIDO data are in nominal terms, we deflate
them using the aggregate GDP deflator (taken from the WDI), as is standard in the
literature (e.g. Kroszner et al., 2007; Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2009; Gupta and Yuan,
2009; Levchenko et al., 2009; Rajan and Subramanian, 2011).9 Appendix C provides
detailed descriptions of which data were drawn from which source.
8The VIX index provides a more explicit measure of risk appetite; however, the VIX is available only
since the early 1990s, whereas corporate bond spreads are available the point where our sample begins
in the mid-1970s.
9Since industry-level deflators are not available for a broad set of countries, the alternate approach
taken by Koren and Tenreyro (2007) is to use US industry-level deflators. We use the method most
widely used in the literature.
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3.2.3 Descriptive Statistics
Our baseline methodology identifies 141 episodes of large capital inflows occurring be-
tween 1975 and 2010, of which 38 took place in advanced economies and 68 in emerging
markets (A full list of these episodes is provided in Appendix C).10 Reassuringly, our
methodology captures well known examples of large capital inflows such as the lead-up
to well-known crises in Latin America in the early 1980s, Scandinavia in the early 1990s,
East Asia in the late 1990s, and the Eurozone periphery in the mid-2000s. We also pick up
less well-known episodes that did not end in crisis, such as inflows to Canada in the early
1990s. Importantly, the episodes we identify include the large capital inflows to emerging
markets such as Brazil, Indonesia, and Turkey following the 2008 crisis. The number of
episodes we identify is consistent with the the findings of Reinhart and Reinhart (2009),
who identify 207 capital flow “bonanzas” in middle- and high-income countries between
1980 and 2007, of which 112 last more than one year.
The average episode duration was just under four years. Table 3.1 gives the average
current account deficit (as a share of trend GDP), number of episodes, and average
duration of episodes in major regions over the four decades covered by our analysis.
Overall, the incidence of episodes of large capital inflows rises over time, with 36 percent
of all episodes taking place after 2000. This pattern reflects the fact that governments
have consistently liberalized controls on capital inflows since the 1970s (as documented
by, for example, Chinn and Ito, 2006). The share of episodes in the advanced economies
fell throughout the 1970s, 80s, and 90s, but rose to nearly 18 percent in the 2000s as the
countries of the Eurozone periphery received large capital inflows, reflecting the launch
of the Euro as well as the accession of Eastern European economies. While the share
of episodes occurring in Latin America during in the 1970s was high, more recently it
has seen around one fifth of all episodes. Similarly, Asia has consistently played host
to roughly one fifth of episodes. In both the 1990s and 2000s, a third of episodes have
occurred in Eastern European countries. This means that the region played host to more
episodes than any other during the 2000s.
The average duration of episodes has fallen slightly over time from just over 4 years
to around 3.5. The size of the current account relative to the economy during these
episodes is substantially larger in most emerging markets in all regions than in the ad-
vanced economies. While the average current account deficit has fallen over time in the
advanced economies, Latin America, and of course Asia, it has risen substantially in
Eastern Europe. Note that in Asia during the 2000s the average current account balance
10We define emerging markets broadly, including in this category countries in either the JPMorgan
Emerging Market Bond Index (EMBI) or the S&P/International Finance Corporation Emerging Markets
Database Investable Index (S&P IFCI Index). Advanced economies are the high-income members of the
OECD.
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Table 3.1: Capital Inflows Episodes: Summary Statistics
Decade of Episode Start
1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s Total
Advanced Economies
Number of Episodes 12 11 4 9 36
Ave.Duration 4.08 4.91 6.5 4.11 4.61
Ave.CA(%GDP) -4.49 -4.32 -0.75 -3.48 -3.77
Latin America
Number of Episodes 5 10 6 6 27
Ave.Duration 3.8 3.9 4 3.5 3.81
Ave.CA(%GDP) -8.05 -7.73 -5.87 -7.09 -7.23
Africa
Number of Episodes 4 2 1 5 12
Ave.Duration 5 3.5 2 4.4 4.25
Ave.CA(%GDP) -13.02 -5.41 -8.32 -5.26 -8.12
E.Europe
Number of Episodes 1 1 12 16 30
Ave.Duration 3 5 3.08 3.44 3.33
Ave.CA(%GDP) -4.72 -5.16 -5.7 -10.01 -7.95
Asia
Number of Episodes 1 7 6 10 24
Ave.Duration 4 3.29 3.33 3 3.21
Ave.CA(%GDP) -6.58 -8.31 -6.07 2.32 -3.25
Middle East & N.Africa
Number of Episodes 2 2 3 5 12
Ave.Duration 5.5 4.5 2.33 3.6 3.75
Ave.CA(%GDP) -11.03 -7.05 -8.12 -8.53 -8.6
Total
Number of Episodes 25 33 32 51 141
Ave.Duration 4.24 4.15 3.63 3.59 3.84
Ave.CA(%GDP) -7.18 -6.46 -5.49 -5.49 -6.01
Sources: IMF BoPS, Authors’ Calculations
even during these episodes was over four percent of GDP. This happens for two reasons.
First, because we measure capital inflows by subtracting the change in official reserves
from the current account balance, our method will flag countries receiving substantial
capital inflows while nonetheless running a current account surplus due to the authori-
ties’ purchases of foreign reserves. Second, our methodology looks at the deviation of our
inflow measure from its long-run trend.
Table 3.2 examines the relationship between the capital inflows episodes that we identify,
capital flow reversals, and sudden stops. Of the episodes of unusually large capital inflows
that we study, 107 (76 percent) end in a reversal as defined by Calvo et al. (2004). Just
over 40 percent inflows episodes coincided with a sudden stop.11 Although emerging mar-
11Recall that according to Calvo et al. (2004) and others (Rothenberg and Warnock, 2011b; Forbes
and Warnock, 2012b), a reversal occurs when the year on year change in capital inflows is at least two
63
Table 3.2: Capital Inflows Episodes, Reversals, & Sudden Stops
Advanced Emerging Other
Economies Economies Economies Total
Total Episodes: 38 68 35 141
Of which:
Ending in Reversal 33 47 27 107
(% of Group Total) (86.8) (69.1) (77.1) (75.9)
Of which:
Ending in Sudden Stop 21 28 8 57
(% of Group Total) (55.3) (41.2) (22.9) (40.4)
Sources: IFS, WDI, Authors’ Calculations
kets experienced more episodes of large capital inflows than advanced economies, Table
3.2 suggests that these are less likely to end abruptly. Episodes in advanced economies
ended in a reversal nearly 90 percent the time and a sudden stop in 55 percent of cases.
For emerging markets, large capital inflows reversed sharply in 70 percent of episodes and
led to a sudden stop just over 40 percent of the time.
3.3 Event Analysis
3.3.1 Behavior of Macroeconomic Indicators
We now examine in more detail the behavior of several macroeconomic variables during
eight-year event windows that begin two years before the start of each inflows episode.
In general this window captures the point at which the variables first diverge from their
trend level as well as the trough of the post-boom drop. As is standard in much of the
literature (e.g. Gourinchas et al., 2001; Mendoza and Terrones, 2008; Cardarelli et al.,
2010), we look at how these variable move relative to their HP trend. Figure 3.2 makes
clear that output, consumption, and investment are on average equal to their trend values
three years before the peak of an episode. Output and consumption rise between two and
three percent above trend through the peak of the episode and then fall to two percent
below trend in the subsequent three years. Similarly investment and credit to the private
sector rise to 10 percent above trend, then drop to five percent below. The pattern is
similar for total employment and total factor productivity, with these variables rising
above trend as capital flows increase, then dropping significantly after the flows begin to
wane.
Figure 3.3 examines the path of external variables during episodes of large capital inflows.
Confirming that we have indeed identified episodes of large inflows, the current account
standard deviations below the mean. A sudden stop occurs when a reversal coincides with an output
contraction Calvo et al. (2004).
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Figure 3.2: Capital Inflows Episodes and Macroeconomic Performance
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deficit goes from an average of just under two percent of GDP prior to start of the episode
to between five and six percent in the first two years after the start of the episode, before
returning to its original level after five years. Large capital inflows also coincide with a six
percent appreciation of the real exchange rate (represented by a rise in the index plotted
in Figure 3.3). The real exchange rate remains above its trend value for approximately
four years, which is the average duration of the episodes in our sample.
Next we look at international liquidity conditions during periods of large capital inflows,
as captured by two measures of financial financial conditions in the US. First, we take take
the US real interest rate as a proxy for the international interest rate. When the typical
episode begins, the real effective federal funds rate is on average around 1.4 percent,
significantly below its average value of 1.65 during the period we analyze (this is plotted
in the bottom left panel of Figure 3.3). The US interest rate then rises, peaking three
years after the start of the episode. This is just before the point at which the average
episode ends.
Second, we test whether prevalent attitudes towards risk in major financial markets vary
around the episodes that we identify, taking corporate bonds spreads in the US as a
measure of risk appetite. In the two years before the start of an episode, bond spreads
are below their long term average of 1.1 percentage points (again plotted in Figure 3.3).
Episodes tend to coincide with rising spreads, which peak between three and four years
after the start of an episode. The median spread, however, diverges substantially from the
mean, spiking sharply four years after the start the episode. Given that the typical episode
ends after three years, this suggests that the end of large capital inflows is associated with
a drop in risk appetite on the part of US investors. The low levels of interest rates and
corporate bond spreads at the start of the episodes we identify indicate that an increase
in the supply of international lending, as opposed to changes in domestic fundamentals
in the recipient country, plays a role in generating large capital flows.
There are two points worth mentioning with regard to the findings just discussed. First,
these patterns hold for both emerging markets and advanced economies as well as overall.
The size of the fluctuations in emerging markets is larger, however, consistent with the
well-documented fact that emerging economies are more volatile in general (Lucas, 1988;
Neumeyer and Perri, 2005; Koren and Tenreyro, 2013). Second, the behavior of these
macroeconomic variables is consistent with the literature on sudden stops, which has for
example consistently found that productivity drops when capital flows come to a halt.
However, it is worth recalling that only 40 percent of inflows episodes end in a sudden
stop.
Next we turn our attention to the sectoral allocation of production during episodes of
large capital inflows. We examine three measures of sectoral allocation: the shre of
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Figure 3.3: Capital Inflows Episodes and the External Sector
−
8
−
6
−
4
−
2
0
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 P
oi
nt
s
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Current Account
−
4
−
2
0
2
4
6
Pe
rc
en
t D
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 H
P 
Tr
en
d
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Real Exchange Rate
0
1
2
3
4
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 P
oi
nt
s
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Real Effective Federal Funds Rate
.
9
1
1.
1
1.
2
1.
3
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 P
oi
nt
s
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
US Corporate Bond Spread (Baa−Aaa)
Note: t=0 at start of capital inflows episode; Sources: IMF BoPS,WDI,FRED
Mean Median One SE Band
manufacturing in total value-added, employment in the manufacturing sector as a share
of total employment, and investment in the manufacturing sector as a share of total
investment. The value-added share is a commonly used measure of sectoral allocation,
while we look at the use of factors of production in order to study in more detail the
sources of that reallocation. We use manufacturing as a proxy for the tradables sector
in order to maximize the number of capital inflows episodes included in the analysis,
since data on agriculture and mining (the other components of tradables) are less widely
available. We detrend the sectoral shares because these exhibit clear time trends in nearly
all countries in the sample. In advanced economies, the sectoral shares of tradables and
manufacturing are steadily falling over time, reflecting a structural shift towards services.
By contrast, the importance of tradables and manufacturing rises steadily over time in
most emerging and developing economies. Here we detrend using an HP filter for the sake
of consistency, but the results are almost identical with linear or quadratic detrending.
In the left-hand panel of Figure 3.4, we plot the movement of the share of manufacturing
in total value added. The share is typically very close to trend when the episodes starts,
then falls by 0.3 percentage points during the first three years of the boom, indicating a
shift in production towards the nontradables sector. The change in sectoral allocation is
then gradually reversed, during what are typically the years after the end of the episode.
Looking at how the allocation of inputs changes during the episodes we identify, we find
some evidence of a drop in the shares of employment and investment in manufacturing.
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Figure 3.4: Capital Inflows Episodes and Sectoral Allocation
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Although both the mean and median values of the sectoral shares show a clear drop below
trend during episodes of large capital inflows, the magnitudes of the shifts are relatively
small—0.15 percentage points for employment and slightly above -0.6 percentage points
in the case of investment. However, the detrended sectoral shares are not particularly
volatile variables, with the mean absolute deviation from trend for employment only 0.5
percentage points and 1.5 percentage points for investment in the countries in our sample.
The patterns discussed here indicate that the four Eurozone periphery countries discussed
in the introduction are typical of countries experiencing unusually large capital inflows,
rather than exceptional cases. The start of episodes of large capital inflows generally coin-
cides with an rise in output, and expansion of credit, and an acceleration in productivity
growth. As capital inflows subside, these variables all drop below trend—a post-episode
downturn. In addition, the share of resources dedicated to the production of tradable
goods tends to fall during episodes of large capital inflows, rising back towards its trend
level once the episode has finished.
3.3.2 Sectoral Reallocation and Economic Performance
when Capital Flows Fall
The patterns just discussed raise the question of how these various macroeconomic vari-
ables co-move. In Table 3.3 we begin our analysis of these co-movements by examining
the bivariate correlations between economic conditions in the three-year period prior to
the peak of the capital inflows episodes and macroeconomic performance in the three
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years after capital flows begin to fall.12 The episode peak is defined as year with the
largest annual capital inflows during the episode. We find that a larger initial credit
boom is strongly and significantly associated with lower output, consumption, invest-
ment, and employment. Similarly, episodes with greater real exchange rate appreciation
are typically followed by a deeper slump.
In Table 3.3 we once again use the manufacturing sector as a proxy for the tradables
sector of the economy. Thus, a fall in the share of manufacturing in the years before
the episode peak represents a shift of resources away from the tradables sector and into
the production of nontradables. Many researchers have used sectoral share of output or
value-added as a measure of resource allocation (e.g. Rodrik, 2008; Giavazzi and Spaventa,
2010). The final three columns of Table 3.3 reveal a more nuanced picture.
Table 3.3: Bivariate Correlations,
Sectoral Reallocation and Macroeconomic Performance
Pre-Peak Averages:
Post-Peak Private Real Manufacturing Share of Total
Averages: Credit1 Exchange Rate2 Value-Added3 Employment3 Investment3
GDP1 -0.426 -0.223 0.228 0.028 0.205
(0.000) (0.050) (0.020) (0.795) (0.070)
Consumption1 -0.246 -0.195 0.204 -0.122 0.222
(0.008) (0.089) (0.039) (0.261) (0.051)
Investment1 -0.469 -0.225 0.195 0.073 0.199
(0.000) (0.050) (0.049) (0.504) (0.082)
Employment2 -0.303 -0.412 0.422 0.154 0.099
(0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.168) (0.415)
Notes: p-values in parenthesis. Pre- and post-peak averages are mean values 3 years before
and after the year capital inflows peak. 1Real per capita terms; log deviation from HP trend.
2Log deviation from HP trend. 3Percentage points deviation from HP trend. See Appendix
C for data sources.
We do find that manufacturing value-added share is positively and significantly associated
with the four macroeconomic indicators. However, when we look at the allocation of
inputs, the share of employment is never significantly related to post-episode performance.
By contrast, the share of investment going to the manufacturing sector during the boom
period is significantly associated with better economic performance along three of the four
dimensions once capital flows start to dry up. The correlations in Table 3.3 change very
little when the sample is restricted either to advanced economies or to emerging markets,
indicating that the results are not driven by patterns in either of these subgroups.
Next we examine whether these unconditional relationships remain once we control for
other relevant factors. In Table 3.4 we estimate the following model in order to study in
more detail the relationship between credit, external factors, and sectoral allocation dur-
12These results are robust to expanding the window length, although this forces us to drop several
episodes near the end of the sample period.
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ing the boom years of an episode of large capital inflows and macroeconomic performance
in the years when capital inflows are falling:
yi,post = α + β1CREDITi,post + β2CREDITi,pre
+β3FED FUNDSi,post + β4FED FUNDSi,pre
+β5MANUF EMPi,post + β6MANUF EMPi,pre
+β7MANUF INVi,post + β8MANUF INVi,pre + εi,post,
Where the dependent variable yi,post is the average of a measure of economic performance
after capital inflows have peaked and begun to fall during episode i. The dependent
variables we consider are the average values of GDP, Investment, Employment, and TFP
(all HP detrended) during the three years after capital inflows reach their peak, as well
as the length of time after the peak of capital inflows that GDP is below its trend value.
The variable CREDITi,post is the average value of HP-detrended real credit to the private
sector in the three years after capital inflows have peaked in episode i, while CREDITi,pre
is average credit in the three years before capital inflows reach their peak for episode i.
Similarly, the other independent variables represent the pre- and post-peak averages of
the US effective Federal Funds rate (FED FUNDSi,t), the share of manufacturing in
total employment (MANUF EMPi,t), and manufacturing investment as share of total
investment (MANUF INVi,t), where the sectoral shares are measured as the deviation
from their HP trends. By controlling for their contemporaneous values we ensure that
we are in fact capturing the relationship between the independent variables value prior
to the peak and economic performance afterward.13 This specification is not intended to
identify causal relationships, but rather to determine whether the bivariate relationships
discussed are robust.
The results in Table 3.4 confirm that a larger boom in credit during the years in which
capital flows are rising is associated with a longer post-peak recession as well as lower
output, investment, employment, and productivity during the period of falling inflows.
By contrast, looser credit conditions in the three years after inflows peak are positively
related to macroeconomic performance. While international liquidity conditions during
the expansionary phase of the inflows episodes, as proxied by the real Fed Funds rate,
are not significantly related to post-peak economic performance, lower US interest rates
do coincide with higher GDP in the years after the episode peak, as well as with shorter
post-peak downturns.
13Controlling for the post-peak values of these variables also helps to control for the degree of factor
market flexibility in each economy. It may be the case that countries with greater labor market flex-
ibility fare better once capital inflows fall, flexibility might also mean that the economy exhibits more
reallocation of labor and capital during the period of growing capital inflows, which we refer to as the
length of the downturn.
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Table 3.4: Regression Results,
Episode Characteristics and Economic Performance
Dependent Variable: Downturn
(Post-Peak) Length GDP1 Investment1 Employment2 TFP2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Private Credit,1 0.0602** 0.132*** 0.380*** 0.0258 0.0848***
Post-Peak (0.026) (0.031) (0.089) (0.033) (0.023)
Private Credit,1 0.0540** -0.0897*** -0.369*** -0.044 -0.0612**
Pre-Peak (0.026) (0.026) (0.096) (0.038) (0.029)
Fed Funds Rate,3 0.279*** -0.181* -0.297 0.0212 -0.0179
Post-Peak (0.096) (0.094) (0.304) (0.132) (0.112)
Fed Funds Rate,3 0.0874 -0.0651 0.293 -0.0642 -0.084
Pre-Peak (0.179) (0.156) (0.588) (0.207) (0.164)
Manuf. Employment,4 -1.082* 2.035*** 7.461*** 1.398** 1.688***
Post-Peak (0.578) (0.483) (1.664) (0.646) (0.622)
Manuf. Employment,4 -1.177*** 0.439 3.270** 1.680*** -0.468
Pre-Peak (0.383) (0.416) (1.593) (0.446) (0.364)
Manuf. Investment,4 -0.301** -0.185 -0.962 0.0651 -0.366**
Post-Peak (0.121) (0.158) (0.683) (0.268) (0.178)
Manuf. Investment,4 -0.126 -0.0619 -0.652 -0.16 -0.00243
Pre-Peak (0.151) (0.269) (0.772) (0.368) (0.207)
Observations 66 66 64 65 65
R-squared 0.409 0.66 0.701 0.309 0.518
Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Pre- and post-peak
values are averages for 3 years before and after the year capital inflows peak. 1Real, per capita
terms; log deviation from HP trend. 2Log deviation from HP trend. 3Percentage points.
4Share of total; percentage points deviation from HP trend. See Appendix C for data sources.
The conditional relationship between macroeconomic performance and the sectoral allo-
cation of labor and capital differs from the patterns we observed in the bivariate corre-
lations. The share of employment in manufacturing during the pre-peak period is now
significantly associated with a shorter post-peak downturn as well as higher investment
and employment in the years when capital inflows are falling. The coefficient on pre-
peak labor allocation is also positive, but not significant. As would be expected given
the relatively high average productivity of the manufacturing sector, a shift of labor into
the manufacturing sector in the post-peak period is always positively and significantly
related to economic performance. By contrast, Table 3.4 shows no systematic relation-
ship between the share of total investment allocated to manufacturing in the pre-peak
period and post-peak economic performance, as measured by growth, investment, or em-
ployment. A higher share of investment in manufacturing during the post-peak period is
however associated with a shorter downturn.
Putting these coefficients in perspective, during the mid-2000s employment in the trad-
ables sector in Ireland ran 0.3 percentage points below its HP trend. According to the
results in 3.4, this reallocation of labor is typically associated with the post-inflow reces-
sion lasting four months longer, with investment lower by 1.5 percent and employment
0.5 percent lower each year. Like the Eurozone periphery, countries in Eastern Europe
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received large capital inflows during the mid-2000s. In these countries (Poland, Hungary,
Bulgaria, and the Baltic Republics) the share of the labor force in manufacturing actu-
ally rose to between 0.6 and 0.9 percentage points above its trend. Our results imply
this reallocation would typically coincide with a post-episode downturn shorter by nine
months or a year, investment two or three percent higher, and employment between one
and 1.5 percent higher.
These findings suggest that once we control for the size of the credit boom during episodes
of capital inflows and for international liquidity conditions, the sectoral allocation of labor
is significantly related to economic performance in the post-boom period. These findings
are consistent with the analysis of Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010), who show that the use
of external borrowing to finance the expansion of nontradables production can render the
current account position unsustainable. However, our results indicate the allocation of
labor is more informative regarding post-episode performance than the sectoral allocation
of investment. To understand why this might be the case, in the next section we model
a small open economy and examine its responses to shocks that produce an episode of
capital inflows.
3.4 A Model of Capital Inflows and Sectoral Alloca-
tion
In the previous section, we found evidence that the share of labor in the tradables sector
during episodes of large capital inflows is correlated with the severity of the post-episode
downturn, while the sectoral allocation of investment was not. We now present a model of
a small open economy in which an increase in net borrowing, that is, an increase in capital
inflows, may occur for three reasons. In the first scenario we consider, an increase in future
productivity prompts households to increase borrowing in order to smooth consumption
of their increased lifetime wealth. Second, we analyze the economy’s response to a fall in
the rate at which agents can borrow from abroad. Third, we consider a immediate and
permanent increase in the productivity of the tradables sector.
In all three cases, the increase in capital inflows is accompanied by a rise in aggregate
consumption and investment as well as a shift of investment into the tradables sector.
However, we show that the immediate reallocation of labor depends on the type of shock
hitting the economy. Both an increase in future productivity and a fall in the interest rate
generate a rise in the share of labor allocated to the nontradables sector. By contrast, a
permanent increase in tradables productivity prompts a shift of labor into the tradables
sector.
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3.4.1 Model Environment
In order to analyze the relationship between capital inflows, the sectoral allocation of
resources, and macroeconomic outcomes we study a two-period model of a small open
economy in which there are two sectors, one producing a tradable goods and the other
producing a non-tradable good, indexed by i = T,NT , respectively. A representative
household maximizes utility from consumption while inelastically supplying L units of
labor each period. Lifetime utility is given by
logC0 + β logC1 (3.1)
where 0 < β < 1 is the subjective discount factor. Aggregate consumption Ct is a
Cobb-Douglas aggregate of tradable and non-tradable goods
Ct = (C
T
t )
ω(CNt )
1−ω
With ω the share of consumption expenditure devoted to tradable goods. The household
faces the following flow budget constraints
CT0 + P0C
N
0 +B0 = W0L0 + Π0 (3.2)
CT1 + P1C
N
1 = RB0 +W1L1 + Π1 + Y2.
We give the household an endowment Y2 in the second period in order to ensure that the
economy is a net borrower from abroad during the first period. The price of tradable
goods is normalized to one, while the price of nontradable goods in terms of tradables is
given by Pt. The household purchases B0 riskless bonds in the first period, which pay a
return R given by the exogenous world interest rate. We assume that βR < 1 so that
household are relatively impatient and borrow in the first period. We also assume labor
is perfectly mobile across sectors, so that the household’s total wage income is given by
WtL. All firms are owned by the representative household, which receives dividends Πt
each period.
The household’s optimal mix of tradables and nontradables consumption is defined by
Pt =
1− ω
ω
CTt
CNt
, (3.3)
while the household divides consumption over time according to a standard Euler equation
1
CT0
= Rβ
1
CT1
. (3.4)
A large number of firms produce tradable and nontradable goods using labor and capital
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in a Cobb-Douglas production process given by
Y i = (Ki)α(AiLi)1−α
for i = T,N . Each period firms maximize profits,
Πi = P iY i −WLi −RkKi,
Where Rk is the rental rate for capital and W is the wage. In the first period, firms chose
both labor input Li0 and investment, I
i
0, while in the second period, firms only decision
variable is labor. Since the initial capital stock Ki0 is exogenously given, we normalize it to
one and assume that capital fully depreciates so that I i0 = K
i
1 in both sectors. Moreover,
we assume that firms use only tradable goods in the production of capital goods, a realistic
assumption given that most investment goods used in the production of nontradables like
services and housing, such as office equipment and construction machinery, are tradable.
Capital and labor can move freely between sectors, so that in equilibrium wages and
returns to capital are equal across sectors. Moreover, by an arbitrage argument the
rental rate of capital, RK , will be equal to the international interest rate R. Firms
optimal choices of labor and capital therefore satisfy
W0 = (1− α)(AT0 )1−α(LT0 )−α = (1− α)P0(AN0 )1−α(LN0 )−α (3.5)
W1 = (1− α)(AT1 )1−α(KT1 )α(LT1 )−α = (1− α)P1(AN1 )1−α(KN1 )α(LN1 )−α (3.6)
R = α(AT1L
T
1 )
1−α(KT1 )
α−1 = αP1(AN1 L
N
1 )
1−α(KN1 )
α−1 (3.7)
Equilibrium requires market clearing in the nontradable goods market. Since these goods
cannot be borrowed from abroad, consumption must equal production in each period,
CNt = Y
N
t . (3.8)
Thus the market clearing conditions for tradable goods are
CT0 +K
T
1 +K
N
1 +B0 = Y
T
0 (3.9)
CT1 = RB0 + Y
T
1 + Y2 (3.10)
while labor market clearing requires that in each period
LT + LN = L. (3.11)
We assume that total labor supply L is constant over time.
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3.4.2 Shocks, Capital Flows, and Sectoral Allocation
In this section we analyze the economy’s response to three types of shocks: A rise in
expected future tradables sector productivity, a fall in the interest rate, and an immediate,
permanent increase in tradables sector productivity.14 We show that the immediate
shift in the allocation of resources generated by the first two shocks are qualitatively
identical, with labor moving into the nontradables sector while investment in nontradables
increases. By contrast, a permanent rise in productivity shifts both labor and capital into
the tradables sector . These results suggest that the relationship between the reallocation
of labor and the severity of the post-episode downturn may reflect the differences in the
causes of capital inflows episodes.
A Rise in Future Tradables Sector Productivity
We first consider an anticipated shock to second-period productivity in the tradables
sector, AT1 . This change in agents’ expectations regarding future productivity will cause
an episode of capital inflows as well as a reallocation of both labor and capital into the
tradables sector. We begin by analyzing in detail firms’ response to this shock, then
discuss the changes in the behavior of households.
Firms respond to the shock by increasing investment to take advantage of the higher
productivity of capital in the future. To see this, first note that combining the optimality
condition for labor and the t = 1 production function expresses output as a linear function
of capital
Y i1 =
(
(1− α)Ai1
W1
P i1
) 1−α
α
Ki1 for i = {T,N}.
The condition for optimal investment thus allows us to write future output as
Y i1 = RK
i
1 (3.12)
and to pin down wages as a function of the interest rate and productivity in the tradables
sector
W1 = (1− α)AT1R
−α
1−α .
Combining the optimality conditions for labor and capital shows that the capital-labor
ratios in both sectors, and therefore the aggregate capital-labor ratio, are a linear function
of the factor price ratio
Ki1
Li1
=
α
1− α
W1
R
=
K1
L
, (3.13)
14We do not study shocks to productivity in the nontradables sector since productivity in this sector
has been shown to change relatively little.
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Where KT1 + K
N
1 = K1. Substituting for wages gives us the aggregate capital stock as
a function of the interest rate, the total labor force, and productivity in the tradables
sector,
K1 = αR
−1
1−αAT1L. (3.14)
This expression makes clear that a rise in second-period tradables productivity will result
in an increase in aggregate investment at time t = 0.
For the household, higher productivity in the future represents a positive shock to life-
time wealth. Motivated by consumption smoothing, households boost not only future
consumption but also their current consumption, which they divide between tradable
and nontradable goods according the the intratemporal optimality condition (3.3). In
Appendix D we show formally that current consumption of tradable goods CT0 will rise.
Although a higher relative price of nontradables P0 dampens the increase in the consump-
tion of nontradables somewhat, it nonetheless rises (again see Appendix D for details).
Since capital is fixed and consumers cannot import nontradables from abroad, this re-
quires that the share of labor employed in the nontradables sector LN0 grow larger. Thus
higher future productivity in the tradables sector produces an immediate reallocation
of labor into the nontradables sector and a drop in tradables production Y T0 , both in
absolute terms and as a share of total output.
Re-writing the market clearing condition for tradables at t = 0 gives first-period borrow-
ing as a function of tradables production, consumption, and aggregate investment (recall
that K1 = K
T
1 +K
N
1 = I
T
0 + I
T
0 ):
B0 = Y
T
0 − CT0 −K1
Consumption of tradable goods and aggregate investment both rise when future produc-
tivity increases, while production of tradable goods falls. As a result, an increase in future
productivity will result in an increase in borrowing B0, or said differently, higher capital
inflows.
Since borrowing must be repaid with tradables, this implies that second-period tradables
production must rise by more than the increase in second-period tradables consumption
(it is clear from the Euler equation 3.4 that CT1 rises). By contrast, market clearing for
nontradables requires that any increase in consumption be matched one-for one by an
increase in production. As a result,
0 < ∆
CT1
CN1
< ∆
Y T1
Y N1
Since we are able to express t = 1 output as a linear function of capital (3.12), the ratio
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of sectoral capital stocks will equal the ratio of tradables output to nontradables output
and therefore
∆
KT
KN
= ∆
Y T
Y N
> 0.
Thus an increase in the future productivity in the tradables sector will result in an increase
in the share of total investment that is allocated the tradables sector in the first period.
A Fall in the Interest Rate
In our second experiment, we analyze the consequences of a fall in the interest rate on
external borrowing R. The economy’s response to this shock is qualitatively identical
to that of an increase in future productivity, with both labor and capital shifting into
the tradables sector. Firms respond the the fall in the price of capital by increasing
aggregate investment, while households respond the drop in borrowing costs by shifting
more of their consumption into the present. Higher investment demand combined with
greater demand for nontradables by consumers results in an increase in capital inflows
(See Appendix D for the mathematical proof of these results).
Once again, although the price of nontradable goods rises this effect does not outweigh
positive effect of the interest rate shock on demand for nontradables, and consumption of
both goods rises. Increased demand for nontradables results in the reallocation of labor
into the nontradable sector.
The shift in consumption towards the present in response to the change in intertemporal
prices means that demand for both tradables and nontradables will fall in the future.
Since nontradables cannot be exported to service debt, this results in a drop in future
nontradables production. The lower the cost of capital prompts firms in both sectors
to boost their capital labor ratios (equation 3.13). Rewriting the production function in
terms of the capital labor ratio gives
Y N1 = (A
T
1 )
1−α
(
KN1
LN1
)α
LN1
Since nontradables production falls and the capital-labor ratio rises, this expression makes
clear that the sector’s use of labor LN1 will fall. The shift of workers into tradables
production, combined with the higher optimal capital labor ratio, results in an increase
in investment in the tradables sector. Thus as was the case with a rise in expected
future productivity, a drop in interest rates will cause an immediate shift of labor into
the nontradables sector as well as reallocation of investment towards the tradables sector.
A Permanent Increase in Tradables Productivity
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Third and finally, we consider what happens when productivity rises in the first period and
remains high in the future. As with the other two shocks we have analyzed, the change in
sectoral productivity will result in a reallocation of investment into the tradables sector.
However, in this scenario the immediate impact of the shock is a shift of labor into the
tradables sector.
Since the rise in productivity is permanent, firms respond by increasing aggregate invest-
ment in order to take advantage of the higher productivity in the future. Consumption
demand also increases as households respond to the increase in their lifetime wealth by
boosting total consumption, in particular their consumption of tradables. As a result,
the economy experiences a rise in capital inflows.
Unlike in the previous case, the immediate rise in productivity in the tradables sector cre-
ates an incentive for firms to shift labor away from nontradables production. Consumers’
desire to divide their increased consumption between the two goods is outweighed by
an increase in the price of nontradables, and consumption of nontradables actually falls
(once again, a mathematical proof of these results is found in Appendix D). Since the
current capital is fixed, the share of labor employed in the production of nontradables
falls. Thus the sectoral allocations of labor and capital move in opposite directions in
response to an immediate and permanent increase in tradables productivity, making this
case qualitatively different from the previous two shocks we considered.
3.4.3 Implications of Model Results
Our analysis of a two-sector small open economy therefore helps us interpret the patterns
observed in the data. Episodes of large capital inflows that coincide with the reallocation
of labor into the nontradables sector are generated by either a fall in international interest
rates or by a rise in expectations regarding future productivity. By contrast, a positive
shock to tradables productivity which has already been realized drives those episode in
which labor moves into the tradables sector. That three different types of shocks result
in a shift in investment towards tradables is consistent with our finding that the extent
of investment reallocation during the period of capital inflows is unrelated to subsequent
economic performance. Likewise, the absence of a relationship between US interest rates
and post-episode performance is consistent with the identical responses produced by
interest rate shock and anticipated productivity shocks in the model
It is striking that both exceptionally low interest rates on foreign borrowing and an-
ticipated productivity gains have been mentioned as factors contributing to economic
imbalances and recession in the Eurozone periphery (Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010) dis-
cuss both factors, while Benigno and Fornaro (2013) highlight the role of low interest
78
rates). Capital inflows generated by these two types of shock involve clear risks. The in-
terest rate at which countries can borrow from abroad can rise suddenly and dramatically,
as occurred in the Eurozone in 2011. Moreover, expected increases in future productiv-
ity may not in fact be realized, instead reflecting what Chen et al. (2013) refer to as
“over-optimistic expectations of convergence” in the case of the Eurozone. In this case,
capital inflows leave the country with a larger external debt burden but without the in-
creased capacity to service those debts that was expected when they were incurred. An
increase in tradables sector productivity that has already been realized will also result
in large capital inflows, but these reflect improved domestic fundamentals rather than
expectations of improvement that may prove incorrect.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the experiences of 69 middle- and high-income countries that
underwent episodes of large capital inflows between 1975 and 2010. A large majority
of these episodes end in a sharp reversal of capital inflows, but only about half of these
reversals are sudden stops in which output contracts. Nonetheless, our event study shows
that in the typical episode output rises initially but then drops below trend as capital
inflows subside. Aggregate productivity follows a similar path, remaining below its trend
level for more than three years after the episode ends. The episodes that we identify
typically begin in years when US interest rates are below average and when risk appetite
in US financial markets is higher than average, suggesting that supply factors drive a
significant share of the episodes in our sample.
Large capital inflows also coincided with a shift of both labor and capital into the pro-
duction of nontradables. Our regression analysis revealed that post-episode economic
performance was significantly and negatively related not only to the size of the credit
boom generated by capital inflows, but also the extent to which labor moves into the
nontradables sector. By contrast, international liquidity conditions and the allocation
of investment were uninformative regarding the severity and length of the post-boom
downturn.
In order to interpret these results, we built a model of a two-sector small open economy
and examined its response to three types of shocks, all of which generate an increase in
capital inflows. This exercise showed that the extent of labor reallocation during inflows
episodes is potentially informative about the drivers of capital inflows, with only positive
productivity shocks that have already been realized capable of generating a shift in labor
into the tradables sector.
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To the extent that capital inflows driven by low interest rates on external borrowing or
expected but not yet realized productivity gains expose the recipient economy to greater
risk than inflows generated by productivity improvements that have already occurred,
this result is consistent with the empirical relationship between labor reallocation and
the severity of the post-episode downturn. Our findings therefore indicate that policy-
makers should monitor the sectoral allocation of labor during periods of exceptionally
large capital inflows. A shift in employment into the production of nontradable goods
may signal increased risk of a hard landing. We leave an analysis of the appropriate
policy response for future work.
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Appendix A
Data Appendix: Capital Flows Data
A.1 Capital Flows Data
Table A.1: Sources of Monthly Capital Flows Data, Advanced Economies
Country Definition Source
Austria “Portfolio investment, liabilities”
from balance of payments
Oesterreichische Nationalbank
Belgium “Portfolio investment, liabilities”
from balance of payments
National Bank of Belgium
Canada “Portfolio investment, liabilities”
from balance of payments
Statistics Canada
Denmark “Portfolio investment, liabilities”
from balance of payments
Danmarks Nationalbank
Finland “Portfolio investment, liabilities”
from balance of payments
Bank of Finland
Greece “Portfolio investment, liabilities”
from balance of payments
Bank of Greece
Italy “Portfolio investment, liabilities”
from balance of payments
Banca D’Italia
Norway “Portfolio investment in Norway”
from balance of payments
Statistics Norway
Sweden “Portfolio investment, liabilities”
from balance of payments
Statistics Sweden
Portugal “Portfolio investment, liabilities”
from balance of payments
Banco de Portugal
Spain “Portfolio investment, liabilities”
from balance of payments
Banco de Espan˜a
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Table A.2: Sources of Monthly Capital Flows Data, Emerging Markets
Country Definition Source
Brazil “Portfolio investment, liabilities”
from balance of payments
Banco Central do Brasil
Bulgaria “Portfolio investment, liabilities”
from balance of payments
Bulgarian National Bank
Chile “Portfolio investment, liabilities”
from balance of payments
Banco de Chile
Colombia Change in value of securities held by
foreigners
Bolsa de Valores de Colombia
Czech Republic “Portfolio investment, liabilities”
from balance of payments
Ceska Narodni Banka
Hungary “Portfolio investment, liabilities”
from balance of payments
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
India Net investment in equity and debt
by foreign institutional investors
Securies and Exchange Board of
India
Indonesia Net shares transacted by foreign in-
vestors
Jakarta Stock Exchange
Korea “Portfolio investment, liabilities”
from balance of payments
Bank of Korea
Malaysia Foreign Holdings of Malaysian Debt
Securities
Bank Negara Malaysia
Mexico Change in value of securities held by
foreigners
Bolsa Mexicana de Valores
Philippines Portfolio investment, liabilities”
from balance of payments
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
Poland “Portfolio investment, liabilities”
from balance of payments
Narodowy Bank Polski
South Africa Net stocks bought by foreigners on
Johannesburg Stock Exchange
Johannesburg Stock Exchange
Thailand ‘Portfolio investment, liabilities”
from balance of payments
Bank of Thailand
Turkey “Portfolio investment, liabilities”
from balance of payments
Central Bank of the Republic of
Turkey
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Table A.3: Data Sources: Macroeconomic Data
Variable Source
Gross Porfolio Inflows IMF Balance of Payments Statistics
Gross Porfolio Equity Inflows IMF Balance of Payments Statistics
Gross Porfolio Debt Inflows IMF Balance of Payments Statistics
Net FDI Inflows IMF Balance of Payments Statistics
Net Other Inflows IMF Balance of Payments Statistics
Real GDP IMF International Financial Statistics
Investment IMF International Financial Statistics
Consumer Price Index IMF International Financial Statistics
Equity Market Capitalizaiton WDI
Private Sector Credit WDI
Table A.4: Coverage: Capital Flow Volatility Data
Total Portfolio Portfolio Equity Portfolio Debt
Start Date End Date Start Date End Date Start Date End Date
Austria Dec-92 Dec-05 – – – –
Belgium Dec-02 Dec-12 – – – –
Denmark Dec-99 Dec-12 Dec-99 Dec-12 Dec-99 Dec-12
Italy Dec-97 Dec-12 Dec-97 Dec-12 Dec-97 Dec-12
Norway Dec-94 Dec-04 Dec-94 Dec-04 Dec-94 Dec-04
Sweden Dec-07 Dec-12 Dec-07 Dec-12 Dec-07 Dec-12
Canada Jan-89 Dec-12 Jan-89 Dec-12 Jan-89 Dec-12
Finland Dec-96 Dec-12 Dec-96 Dec-12 Dec-96 Dec-12
Greece Dec-00 Dec-12 – – – –
Portugal Dec-96 Dec-12 Dec-96 Dec-12 Dec-96 Dec-12
Spain Jan-00 Dec-12 Jan-00 Apr-08 Jan-00 Apr-08
Turkey Dec-92 Dec-12 Dec-92 Dec-12 Dec-92 Dec-12
South Africa Jun-98 Dec-12 Jun-98 Dec-12 Jun-98 Dec-12
Brazil Dec-95 Dec-12 Dec-95 Dec-12 Dec-95 Dec-12
Chile Sep-02 Dec-12 Sep-02 Dec-12 Sep-02 Dec-12
Colombia Nov-99 Dec-12 Nov-99 Dec-12 Dec-98 Dec-12
Mexico Dec-91 Dec-05 Dec-91 Dec-05 Dec-91 Dec-05
India Nov-97 Dec-12 Nov-97 Dec-12 Apr-96 Dec-12
Indonesia – – – – Dec-01 Dec-12
Korea, Rep. Dec-90 Dec-12 Dec-90 Dec-12 Dec-90 Dec-12
Malaysia – – Jan-06 Dec-12 Dec-99 Dec-12
Philippines Dec-99 Dec-12 Dec-99 Dec-12 Dec-93 Dec-12
Thailand Dec-93 Dec-12 Dec-93 Dec-12 Dec-98 Dec-12
Bulgaria Dec-98 Dec-12 Dec-98 Dec-12 Dec-03 Dec-12
Czech Republic Dec-03 Dec-12 Dec-03 Dec-12 Dec-95 Jul-04
Poland Dec-98 Dec-12 Dec-98 Dec-12 Dec-98 Dec-12
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Figure A.1: Portfolio Capital Inflows: Latin America
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Figure A.2: Portfolio Capital Inflows: Asia
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Figure A.3: Portfolio Capital Inflows: E.Europe
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Figure A.4: Portfolio Capital Inflows: S.Europe
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Figure A.5: Portfolio Capital Inflows: Scandinavia
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Figure A.6: Portfolio Capital Inflows: Other
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A.2 Comparison with IMF Balance of Payments Data
Since the data were collected in order to construct a measure of the volatility of capital
flows rather than their level, it is not crucial that the monthly flows sum precisely to the
relevant quarterly number in the balance of payments. Nonetheless, comparing the data
gathered with IMF balance of payments data does give some sense of what is being mea-
sured for each country. Table A.5 demonstrates that quarterly totals of the monthly data
collected are highly correlated with corresponding lines from the balance of payments,
with the overall correlation 0.73 for equity flows and 0.96 for debt flows.1
Table A.5: Correlations: Collected Data vs. IMF Data
Country Portfolio Equity Inflows Portfolio Debt Inflows
Turkey 1.0000 ∗∗∗ 1.0000 ∗∗∗
S.Africa 0.8567 ∗∗∗ 0.7556 ∗∗∗
Brazil 0.9842 ∗∗∗ 0.9798 ∗∗∗
Chile 0.7718 ∗∗∗ 0.9995 ∗∗∗
Colombia 0.5234 ∗∗∗ 0.3760 ∗∗∗
Mexico 0.3710 ∗∗∗ 0.5833 ∗∗∗
India 1.0000 ∗∗∗ 1.0000 ∗∗∗
Indonesia 0.8734 ∗∗∗ —
Korea 1.0000 ∗∗∗ 1.0000 ∗∗∗
Philippines 1.0000 ∗∗∗ 1.0000 ∗∗∗
Thailand 0.8025 ∗∗∗ 0.1578
Bulgaria 0.9994 ∗∗∗ 0.9985 ∗∗∗
Czech Rep 0.9998 ∗∗∗ 0.9999 ∗∗∗
Hungary 0.9495 ∗∗∗ —
Poland 0.9998 ∗∗∗ 0.9998 ∗∗∗
Overall 0.6991 ∗∗∗ 0.9279 ∗∗∗
Source: IMF Balance of Payments Data, nat’l sources
One possible source of divergence between the financial market data and balance of pay-
ments data stems from the classification of stock purchases as either FDI or portfolio
equity. In the balance of payments, purchases of equity shares greater than 10 percent
are classified as FDI, and once a foreign investor has acquired a share larger than this
threshold, all subsequent equity purchases by that investor are deemed to be FDI re-
gardless of the size of the transaction. Where financial market data are used, all stock
purchases are classified as portfolio equity investment.
1The relevant balance of payments lines are “portfolio liabilities, equity” and “portfolio liabilities,
debt.”
96
Figure A.7: Alternative Volatility Measures
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A.3 Alternate Volatility Measures
This paper measures capital flow volatility using the standard deviation of capital inflows
normalized by GDP. The literature on capital flow volatility suggests two alternative mea-
sures: the coefficient of variation (standard deviation of monthly capital flows normalized
by their mean monthly value) and skewness (the centered third empirical moment divided
by the cube of the standard deviation).2 Each of these methods for measuring capital
flow volatility has advantages and disadvantages. If the mean level capital flows over of
some time periods is near zero, the coefficient of variation will take on extremely large
values. Moreover, measures such as the coefficient of variation and the skewness provide
no information about how the volatility compares to the size of the economy.
Figure A.7 illustrates this point with data for two of the largest emerging markets in the
sample. In both India and Brazil, the volatility of monthly capital inflows relative to
the size of the economy has changed substantially over time. This important change is
not reflected in the coefficient of variation or in the skewness—a potentially important
shortcoming. I am interested in the impact of capital flow volatility on variables such as
growth and investment, and this impact presumably depends on the size of capital flow
2The standard deviation normalized by GDP is employed by Broner & Rigobon 2004; Knill 2005;
Becker & Noone 2009; and Neumann, Penl, & Tanku 2008). The coefficient of variation is used by
Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, & Volosovych 2007 and Levchenko & Mauro 2007). Finally, Ranciere, Tornell,
& Westermann (2008) use skewness.
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fluctuations relative to the size of the economy. Therefore this paper uses the standard
deviation of monthly net capital inflows as a share of GDP to measure capital flow volatil-
ity in the main analysis, then re-run the baseline regressions using both the coefficient of
variation and skewness as a robustness check (these results are available from the author
on request).
A.4 Cyclical Properties of Capital Flow Volatility
Table A.6: Correlations of Capital Flow Volatility (%GDP)
with Real GDP (SA and HP-Filtered): Emerging Markets
Total Portfolio Inflows:
Lagging/Leading Correlations with HP-Filtered Output
(quarterly frequency) Lag Length
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Turkey -0.3504* -0.3199* -0.154 0.060 0.2550* 0.4841* 0.5522*
(0.002) (0.006) (0.188) (0.606) (0.027) (0.000) (0.000)
S.Africa 0.045 0.012 0.006 0.073 0.2504* 0.4611* 0.6410*
(0.755) (0.934) (0.969) (0.601) (0.071) (0.001) (0.000)
Brazil -0.2744* -0.2834* -0.2246* 0.054 0.049 0.060 0.013
(0.032) (0.026) (0.077) (0.671) (0.704) (0.645) (0.919)
Chile -0.180 -0.2506* -0.2842* -0.3091* -0.3234* -0.3472* -0.3360*
(0.180) (0.058) (0.029) (0.016) (0.012) (0.007) (0.009)
Colombia 0.4455* 0.4498* 0.3929* 0.2963* 0.3147* 0.3644* 0.3888*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.033) (0.025) (0.009) (0.006)
Mexico -0.2488* -0.155 -0.024 0.161 0.3271* 0.4973* 0.5590*
(0.062) (0.246) (0.858) (0.219) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000)
India 0.069 0.078 0.113 0.168 0.2367* 0.2888* 0.2948*
(0.611) (0.567) (0.404) (0.211) (0.079) (0.033) (0.031)
Korea -0.2368* -0.2541* -0.2579* -0.2090* -0.163 -0.104 -0.041
(0.033) (0.021) (0.019) (0.056) (0.140) (0.351) (0.716)
Philippines -0.102 -0.073 -0.082 -0.051 0.034 0.123 0.225
(0.505) (0.629) (0.584) (0.728) (0.822) (0.416) (0.137)
Thailand -0.158 -0.149 -0.067 0.046 0.157 0.2128* 0.2362*
(0.195) (0.218) (0.577) (0.700) (0.191) (0.077) (0.051)
Bulgaria 0.139 0.095 0.063 0.053 0.013 -0.043 -0.099
(0.340) (0.513) (0.659) (0.707) (0.926) (0.767) (0.499)
Czech Rep -0.4098* -0.3240* -0.186 -0.015 0.119 0.254 0.3412*
(0.027) (0.081) (0.316) (0.934) (0.525) (0.176) (0.070)
Poland 0.182 0.075 -0.059 -0.2364* -0.2512* -0.2781* -0.2743*
(0.211) (0.605) (0.682) (0.092) (0.075) (0.051) (0.057)
Overall -0.0995* -0.0890* -0.054 0.005 0.054 0.1008* 0.1165*
(0.004) (0.010) (0.119) (0.884) (0.113) (0.004) (0.001)
Source: IMF, national sources. P-values in parentheses. 
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Table A.7: Correlations of Capital Flow Volatility (%GDP)
with Real GDP (SA and HP-Filtered): Advanced Economies
Total Portfolio Inflows
Lagging/Leading Correlations with HP-Filtered Output
(quarterly frequency) Lag Length
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Belgium -0.185 -0.293 -0.3908* -0.4134* -0.3106* -0.140 0.039
(0.320) (0.104) (0.025) (0.015) (0.074) (0.430) (0.828)
Denmark -0.113 -0.187 -0.192 -0.245 -0.318 -0.4560* -0.5794*
(0.618) (0.393) (0.370) (0.237) (0.122) (0.022) (0.002)
Canada -0.033 0.019 0.050 0.071 0.121 0.160 0.172
(0.765) (0.861) (0.649) (0.515) (0.266) (0.142) (0.114)
Finland 0.165 0.174 0.144 0.094 0.098 0.149 0.2243*
(0.228) (0.199) (0.287) (0.484) (0.464) (0.266) (0.091)
Portugal -0.2715* -0.2876* -0.2808* -0.2413* -0.198 -0.137 -0.062
(0.045) (0.032) (0.034) (0.068) (0.136) (0.304) (0.642)
Spain 0.238 0.3227* 0.3849* 0.4018* 0.3957* 0.3419* 0.2672*
(0.116) (0.031) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.025) (0.087)
Overall 0.087 0.077 0.060 0.029 0.019 0.017 0.025
(0.137) (0.186) (0.302) (0.618) (0.736) (0.767) (0.660)
Source: IMF, national sources. P-values in parentheses.
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Appendix B
Mathematical Appendix to Chapter
1
This mathematical appendix has two section. In the first section, I discuss the solvency
constraints that firms face in the model of Section 1.3.1. The second section formally
derives the results that are discussed in Section 1.3.1. Whereas in Section 1.3.1 I set
the liquidation value of long-term investments equal to one in order to highlight that
irreversibility does not drive my results, here I denote the liquidation value φ ∈ [0, 1] as
in Section 1.3.2. This more general specification nests that of Section 1.3.1.
B.1 Solvency Constraints in the Model of Long-Term
Investment
In the model of Section 1.3.1 the entrepreneur’s borrowing in each period to a solvency
constraint. Borrowing in the intermediate period (D2) cannot be greater than the present
value of his final period resources:
D2 ≤ R(I0 − L1) + y2
1 + r
As discussed in detail in Section 1.3.1 and proved in Section B.2 of this Appendix, the
entrepreneur’s optimal second-period borrowing and liquidation will be fully determined
by his initial borrowing and by the realized value of the borrowing constraint. If the
borrowing constraint is sufficiently low, he will liquidate just enough to service his debts;
otherwise he will borrow the precise amount needed to roll over his debts. As a result, the
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t = 1 solvency constraint can be written as an upper bound on initial period borrowing:
D1 ≤ 1
rR
[
R(y0 + κ
min
2 ) + (1 + r)(y1 − κmin2 ) + y2
]
(B.1)
Where κmin2 is the lowest possible value of the second-period borrowing constraint. Like-
wise, the entrepreneur cannot borrow more in the first period than his resources in the
worst-case scenario at time t = 1, so that first period borrowing to finance investment in
long-term projects must satisfy
(1 + r)D1 ≤ κmin2 + I0 + y1,
which simplifies to:
D1 ≤ 1
r
(
y0 + y1 + κ
min
2
)
(B.2)
A complete cutoff in foreign lending is a possibility, so that κmin2 = 0. Even so, comparing
the ceilings on D1 in (B.1) and (B.2) to the level of D1 below which the borrowing
constraint binds ((1 + r)D1 > y1 + κ2) makes clear that (B.1) and (B.2) and are not
so tight as to prevent the entrepreneur from borrowing an amount large enough that he
risks being forced to prematurely liquidate part of his long-term project. Moreover, for
realistic values for the world interest rate and for the return on long-term projects, these
solvency constraints will not bind in the neighborhood of the solution to the entrepreneur’s
problem.
B.2 Solving the Model of Long-Term Investment
In this section, I formally derive the results discussed in Section 1.3.1.
Proposition B.2.1 The non-negativity constraint on dividends does not bind in the final
period: λ2 = 0
Proof λt is the shadow value of the firm’s net worth. Since the firm ceases to exist after
three periods, the value of the firm’s net worth in the final period is simply its value in
terms of consumption, and the shadow value will be zero at t = 2.
Proposition B.2.2 Firms will never pay dividends in the first period.
Proof Bearing in mind Proposition B.2.1, (1.5) becomes
1 + λ0 = β
2R + E0[ζ
(2)
1 ]
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Since β2R > 1 by assumption (domestic investments are profitable if not liquidated) and
ζ
(2)
1 ≥ 0 by definition, it must be the case that λ0 > 0 and d0 = 0.
Proposition B.2.3 If the borrowing constraint does not bind, there will be no liquidation
Proof When the borrowing constraint does not bind (µ1 = 0), the condition for optimal
liquidation (1.8) becomes
ζ
(1)
1 − ζ(2)1 = β[R− φ(1 + r)]
The right-hand side of this equation will be strictly greater than zero since R > (1 + r)2
and φ ≤ 1 by assumption. Since ζ(1)1 and ζ(2)1 are associated with lower and upper
bounds, respectively, on liquidation they will not simultaneously be non-zero. Therefore,
ζ
(2)
1 cannot be non-zero when the borrowing constraint does not bind, meaning that
the upper bound on liquidation will not bind. Consequently, this equation implies that
ζ
(1)
1 > 0 when the borrowing constraint does not bind.
Proposition B.2.4 If the borrowing constraint binds, the non-negativity constraint on
liquidation will not bind
Proof If the borrowing constraint binds, the second-period Euler equation (1.7) shows
that λ1 > 0 and thus d1 = 0. Moreover, from the complementary slackness condition,
D2 = κ2. Substituting into the borrowing constraint gives the optimal level of liquidation
when the borrowing constraint binds:
L1 = φ
−1[(1 + r)D1 − y1 − κ2] (B.3)
The right-hand side of this equation would be zero only if the realized value of κ2 was
exactly φ−1[(1 + r)D1 − y1]. Since κ2 is a continuous variable, this is a zero probability
event. Therefore, L > 0 when the borrowing constraint binds and ζ
(1)
1 = 0 in this
situation.
Proposition B.2.5 The upper bound on liquidation will never bind
Proof It was already shown in the proof of Proposition B.2.3 that ζ
(2)
1 = 0 when the
borrowing constraint does not bind. If the borrowing constraint does bind, if the upper
bound on liquidation were to bind, B.3 (along with Proposition B.2.2 and the t = 1
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budget constraint) would imply that κ2 = (1 + r− φ)D1− φy0 + y1. Once again, with κ2
a continuous variable, this is a zero probability event.1
Before proceeding to the solution, I make an additional simplifying assumption, without
loss of generality. If the borrowing constraint does not bind, with β(1 + r) = 1 (1.7)
implies that λ1 = 0 and thus the firm will pay out dividends. This is because the firm
can exhaust the borrowing constraint borrowing at rate (1 + r), use the funds to pay
dividends, and then pay the money back in the final period. However, agents receive no
real welfare gain from this strategy—in terms of utility, they are indifferent between using
additional borrowing to pay dividends and paying no dividends in the second period. For
simplicity, I assume that the firm does not engage in this type of borrowing. This has no
effect on the level of optimal investment, which is the focus of my analysis.
Thus, when the borrowing constraint does not bind
D2 = (1 + r)D1 − y1.
The right-hand side of this expression also defines κ2, the minimum value of the borrowing
constraint κ2 for which it will not bind.
I am now able to solve the model. When the borrowing constraint binds, the condition
for optimal liquidation (1.8) gives
(1 + λ1) =
βR
φ
Substituting this into the second-period Euler equation allows me to write the Lagrange
multiplier in terms of exogenous parameters:
µ1 = β
[
R
φ
− (1 + r)
]
(B.4)
Combining the two Euler equations (1.6 and 1.7) and the condition for optimal borrowing
gives
β2R = β(1 + r)E0[β(1 + r) + µ1]
1A looser but more intuitive explanation is the following: Liquidation takes place only when the
borrowing constraint binds, and thus when d1 = 0. Since (1 + r)φ < R, it is never profitable to liquidate
investments in order to purchase foreign bonds. Therefore, the only motivation for liquidation is to
service outstanding debts. Under these circumstances, if the feasibility constraint L1 ≤ I0 were to bind,
it would mean that the firm was unable to service its debts. I assume that lenders enforce solvency
constraints on borrowers, and will not lend amounts that introduce the possibility of default. Therefore,
it will always be the case that ζ
(2)
1 = 0.
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Simplifying, substituting from (B.4) and noting that F (κ2) is the probability that the
borrowing constraint will bind, I get
R = (1 + r)2 + (1 + r)F (κ2)
[
R
φ
− (1 + r)
]
Or simply:
F (κ2) =
R− (1 + r)2
R(1+r)
φ
− (1 + r)2
Which pins down optimal initial borrowing D∗2. This is the result obtained in Section
1.3.1.
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Appendix C
Data Appendix: Capital Inflows
Episodes
Table C.1: Data Sources
Variable Source
Current Account IMF Balance of Payments Statistics
Reserves IMF Balance of Payments Statistics
Effective Fed Funds Rate FRED
Baa-Aaa Corporate Bond Spread Global Financial Data
Real Exchange Rate WDI
Output WDI
Consumption WDI
Investment WDI
Credit to the Private Sector WDI
Tradables Value-Added WDI
Nontradables Value-Added WDI
Total Employment ILO LABORSTA
Manufacturing Employment UNIDO INDSTAT2
Manufacturing Investment UNIDO INDSTAT2
TFP Penn World Tables
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Table C.2: Capital Inflows Episodes in Advanced Economies
Average Current
Country Start Year Peak Year End Year Account (%GDP)
United Kingdom 1988 1988 1992 -3.7
Austria 1976 1976 1981 -4.25
Austria 1994 1994 2001 -1.91
Belgium 2008 2008 2009 -1.49
Denmark 1979 1979 1982 -4.05
France 1981 1981 1982 -1.42
France 2005 2005 2011 -1.28
Germany 1979 1979 1981 -1.23
Germany 1991 1991 2001 -1.02
Italy 1980 1980 1982 -2.37
Italy 1991 1991 1992 -2.61
Netherlands 1978 1978 1981 0.38
Netherlands 1998 1998 2002 2.53
Norway 1976 1976 1977 -11.51
Norway 1986 1986 1988 -4.79
Norway 2009 2009 2010 11.15
Sweden 1979 1979 1982 -2.96
Sweden 1989 1989 1997 -0.54
Canada 1975 1975 1981 -3.73
Canada 1989 1989 1994 -3.76
Canada 2009 2009 2011 -3.2
Japan 1979 1979 1982 -0.27
Japan 2009 2009 2011 2.99
Finland 1986 1986 1992 -4.18
Greece 1976 1976 1982 -3.91
Greece 2006 2006 2009 -14.5
Ireland 1979 1979 1982 -12.82
Ireland 2005 2005 2009 -4.64
Portugal 1975 1975 1976 -5.68
Portugal 1981 1981 1983 -11.14
Portugal 2003 2003 2009 -10.44
Spain 1975 1975 1976 -3.87
Spain 1980 1980 1982 -2.83
Spain 2005 2005 2008 -9.94
Australia 1989 1989 1995 -4.82
New Zealand 1982 1982 1987 -7.97
Source: IMF, Authors’ Calculations
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Table C.3: Capital Inflows Episodes in Emerging Markets (1)
Average Current
Country Start Year Peak Year End Year Account (%GDP)
Turkey 1975 1975 1977 -4.72
Turkey 2006 2006 2011 -6.32
South Africa 1981 1981 1984 -3.6
South Africa 2006 2006 2011 -5
Argentina 1980 1980 1983 -4.69
Argentina 1997 1997 2001 -4.27
Brazil 1979 1979 1982 -6.02
Brazil 1997 1997 2001 -4.28
Brazil 2009 2009 2011 -2.07
Chile 1981 1981 1984 -12.63
Colombia 1981 1981 1985 -6.78
Colombia 1994 1994 1998 -6.03
El Salvador 1978 1978 1979 -4.55
El Salvador 1981 1981 1982 -5.74
El Salvador 2004 2004 2008 -5.09
Mexico 1980 1980 1982 -7.25
Mexico 1992 1992 1994 -7.96
Peru 1981 1981 1982 -8.96
Peru 1986 1986 1988 -7.71
Uruguay 1979 1979 1982 -6.92
Uruguay 2009 2009 2011 -2.51
Lebanon 2009 2009 2010 -21.07
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1979 1979 1985 -5.71
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1998 1998 2000 -2.27
Egypt, Arab Rep. 2008 2008 2010 -1.69
India 1985 1985 1990 -2.18
India 2009 2009 2011 -2.9
Indonesia 1982 1982 1983 -7.33
Indonesia 1995 1995 1997 -4.13
Indonesia 2008 2008 2011 0.73
Korea, Rep. 1979 1979 1982 -6.58
Korea, Rep. 1996 1996 1997 -3.48
Korea, Rep. 2008 2008 2010 2.17
Malaysia 1981 1981 1983 -12.46
Malaysia 1994 1994 1997 -7.94
Pakistan 1993 1993 1996 -5.87
Pakistan 2008 2008 2009 -6.32
Philippines 1981 1981 1983 -8.83
Thailand 1994 1994 1997 -7.73
Thailand 2009 2009 2011 4.34
Vietnam 1996 1996 1998 -7.24
Vietnam 2008 2008 2010 -7.96
China 1985 1985 1986 -3.59
China 2009 2009 2011 4.07
Source: IMF, Authors’ Calculations
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Table C.4: Capital Inflows Episodes in Emerging Markets (2)
Average Current
Country Start Year Peak Year End Year Account (%GDP)
Morocco 1976 1976 1982 -12.61
Morocco 2008 2008 2011 -5.92
Tunisia 1976 1976 1977 -9.51
Tunisia 1984 1984 1986 -7.22
Tunisia 1992 1992 1993 -8.32
Tunisia 2009 2009 2011 -4.93
Bulgaria 1986 1986 1990 -5.16
Bulgaria 2005 2005 2008 -21.57
Russian Federation 1996 1996 1998 1.12
Russian Federation 2008 2008 2011 5.47
Ukraine 1994 1994 1998 -2.59
Ukraine 2008 2008 2011 -4.91
Czech Republic 1996 1996 1997 -7.23
Slovak Republic 1996 1996 1998 -8.14
Slovak Republic 2006 2006 2008 -6.28
Estonia 2004 2004 2008 -13.71
Latvia 2006 2006 2008 -23.33
Hungary 1994 1994 1996 -6.15
Hungary 2002 2002 2004 -7.86
Lithuania 1996 1996 1999 -10.09
Lithuania 2007 2007 2008 -17.51
Slovenia 1998 1998 2000 -2.01
Slovenia 2004 2004 2008 -4.22
Poland 1991 1991 1993 -3.8
Poland 1999 1999 2000 -6.39
Poland 2008 2008 2010 -5.68
Source: IMF, Authors’ Calculations
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Table C.5: Capital Inflows Episodes: Other Economies
Average Current
Country Start Year Peak Year End Year Account (%GDP)
Costa Rica 1978 1978 1981 -15.22
Costa Rica 2008 2008 2011 -5.26
Dominican Republic 1978 1978 1982 -7.54
Dominican Republic 2008 2008 2011 -8.1
Guatemala 1980 1980 1982 -5.09
Guatemala 1992 1992 1995 -5.39
Paraguay 1981 1981 1988 -7.45
Paraguay 1996 1996 1997 -7.29
Jamaica 1981 1981 1985 -10.98
Jamaica 2007 2007 2008 -19.52
Cyprus 1977 1977 1980 -16.34
Cyprus 1991 1991 1992 -8.8
Cyprus 2007 2007 2010 -11.85
Israel 1982 1982 1984 -8.4
Israel 2009 2009 2011 2.8
Jordan 1982 1982 1987 -5.7
Jordan 1992 1992 1993 -13.3
Jordan 2005 2005 2010 -10.81
Sri Lanka 1980 1980 1983 -11.55
Sri Lanka 2008 2008 2011 -5.39
Singapore 1980 1980 1982 -12.22
Singapore 2001 2001 2002 11.26
Singapore 2009 2009 2011 23.24
Botswana 1978 1978 1982 -18.48
Botswana 2009 2009 2010 -1.74
Mauritius 1976 1976 1981 -11.45
Mauritius 2005 2005 2011 -8.71
Belarus 1997 1997 1998 -6.91
Belarus 2008 2008 2011 -11.77
Albania 1990 1990 1991 -8.69
Albania 2008 2008 2009 -17.11
Croatia 1995 1995 1999 -7.52
Croatia 2008 2008 2009 -7.87
Macedonia, FYR 2002 2002 2004 -6.56
Macedonia, FYR 2008 2008 2009 -10.92
Source: IMF, Authors’ Calculations
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Appendix D
Mathematical Appendix to Chapter
3
D.1 Analytical Solution of the Model
We start with a system of 19 equations, which have already been described in the text:
four production functions, two intratemporal optimality conditions (3.3), the Euler equa-
tion (3.4), labor demand for the two sectors in both periods (3.5 and 3.6), optimal invest-
ment for both sectors in the first period (3.7), two labor market clearing conditions (3.11),
the two nontradable goods market clearing conditions (3.8), and the two tradable goods
market clearing conditions (3.9 and 3.10). The system is solved by the optimal values of
consumption, output, and employment in the tradable and nontradables sectors in both
periods, as well as equilibrium wages and prices in both periods, optimal borrowing, and
finally optimal investment in the two sectors in the first period.
We eliminate borrowing B0 by combining the tradable goods market clearing conditions
(3.9 and 3.10) into an intratemporal budget constraint. Market clearing in the nontrad-
ables sector (3.8) allows us to eliminate nontradables output Y Nt , while wage equalization
due to free movement of labor between sectors (3.5) lets us eliminate first-period wages
W0. As discussed in the text, we can express second-period output as a linear function
of capital (3.12) and write second-period wages W1 and aggregate capital stock K1 as
functions of exogenous parameters. In addition, combining the optimality conditions for
labor and capital allows us to write the relative price of nontradables at t = 1 as a
function of the ratio of the exogenous sectoral productivities.
PN =
(
AT
AN
)1−α
. (D.1)
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This leaves us with 11 unknowns: consumption in both sectors and time periods; in-
vestment and labor for both sectors at t = 1; tradables output in both periods; and
first-period prices. The remaining 11 equations are
CN0 = (A
N
0 L
N
0 )
1−α and CN1 = RK
N
1
Y T0 = (A
T
0L
T
0 )
1−α and Y T1 = RK
T
1
PNt =
1− ω
ω
CTt
CNt
for t = 0, 1
CT0 +R
−1CT1 +K
T
1 +K
N
1 = Y
T
0 +R
−1 (Y T1 + Y2)
CT1 = RβC
T
0
LTt + L
N
t = L for t = 0, 1
LN0 = P
1/α
(
AN0
AT0
) 1−α
α
LT0
Further substitution leaves three unknowns: first-period values of tradables output and
consumption as well as the relative price of nontradables. The remaining four equations
consist of a modified intratemporal optimality condition
CT0 =
(
ω
1− ω
)(
AN0
AT0
) 1−α
α
P
1
αY T0 ,
An expression derived from labor-market clearing
(Y T0 )
1
1−α
(
(AN0 )
1−α
α (AT0 )
−1
α P0
1
α + (AT0 )
−1
)
= L, (D.2)
and a linear relationship between first-period tradables consumption and output, derived
from the Euler equation and the intertemporal budget constraint
CT0 =
[
1 + β +
1− ω
ω
β
P1
]−1 (
Y T0 +R
−1Y2
)
(D.3)
Since the price of nontradables P1 is increasing in tradables-sector productivity, the share
of first-period tradables production allocated for consumption (which I will call γ) rises
when future productivity increases.
Thus the price of nontradables can be written in terms of tradables output
P
1/α
0 = γ
(
1 +R−1
Y2
Y T0
)
Substituting this into the modified labor-market clearing condition (D.2) and simplifying
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gives (
1− ω
ω
)
γ(AN0 )
(1−α)2
α (AT0 )
−
(
(1−α)2
α
+1
) [
(Y T0 )
1
1−α +R−1Y2(Y T0 )
α
1−α
]
(D.4)
+ (AT0 )
−1(Y T0 )
1
1−α = L. (D.5)
This expresses first-period tradables production as an implict function of the model’s
exogenous parameters.
D.2 An Increase in Future Tradable Sector Produc-
tivity
Here we show that an increase in agent’s expectations regarding the future productivity
of the tradables sector AT1 will cause households to increase their current consumption
of tradable goods. Since first period productivity is not changing, in what follows we set
both AT0 and A
N
0 equal to one to conserve notation.
From the optimal value of second-period prices (D.1) and the consumption function (D.3),
it is clear that an increase in future productivity will increase γ, the share of first pe-
riod tradables production that households consume. Implicitly differentiating (D.5) with
respect to γ gives
∂Y T0
∂γ
=
− (1−ω
ω
) [
(Y T0 )
1
1−α +R−1Y2(Y T0 )
α
1−α
]
(
1−ω
ω
)
γ
[
1
1−α(Y
T
0 )
1
1−α−1 +R−1Y2 α1−α(Y
T
0 )
α
1−α−1
]
+ (Y T0 )
1
1−α−1
< 0
Since capital is fixed at t = 1 an fall in tradables production implies a fall in the production
and therefore consumption of nontradable goods. The modified labor market clearing
condition (D.2) shows that a fall in Y T0 requires that the current price of nontradables P0
rise. From the intratemporal optimality condition, this shows that t = 1 consumption of
tradables CT0 will also rise.
D.3 A Fall in the Interest Rate
We now show that a fall in the interest rate R at which agents in the model economy
borrow from abroad increases current consumption of both tradable and nontradable
goods and leads to an immediate reallocation of labor into the nontradables sector as
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well as an increase in in the share of investment allocated to the tradables sector. Once
again, we set AT0 = A
N
0 = 1 to economize on notation.
Implicit differentiation of (D.5) with respect to R gives:
∂Y T0
∂R
=
(
1−ω
ω
)
γR−2Y2(Y T0 )
α
1−α[
1 +
(
1−ω
ω
)
γ
]
1
1−α(Y
T
0 )
1
1−α−1 +
(
1−ω
ω
)
R−1Y2 α1−α(Y
T
0 )
α
1−α−1
> 0
So that a fall in R will result in a fall in Y T0 . Intuitively, the fall in the interest rate induces
the household to shift consumption into the first period, optimally dividing the higher
consumption between tradables and nontradables. Higher consumption of nontradables
requires an immediate increase in nontradables production. Since capital is fixed, this
requires that labor shift into the nontradables sector (an increase in LN0 and a fall in L
T
0 )
and tradables production must fall.
Looking at the the modified labor-market clearing condition (D.2) it is clear that lower
Y T0 implies that the price of nontradables P0 increase in response to the lower interest
rate. Since both the quantity of nontradables consumed and their price have increased,
from the intratemporal optimality condition (3.3), we know that tradables consumption
will also rise.
To see what happens in the second period, combine the Euler equation and the consump-
tion function (D.3) to get
CT1 = βγ[RY
T
0 + Y2]
Since nontradables output falls when the interest rate drops, this shows that consumption
of tradables in the second period will fall. Since second-period prices depend only on the
ratio of sectoral productivity, we see from the intratemporal optimality condtion (3.3) that
the ratio of tradable to nontradable consumption in the second-period will not respond
to changes in the interest rate, and therefore nontradables consumption CN1 and output
Y N1 will also fall.
From 3.13 and 3.14 we know that a fall in the interest rate will increase the capital-labor
ratio in both sectors. Rewriting the production function for nontradables in terms of the
capital-labor ratio gives
Y N1 = (A
N
1 )
1−α
(
KN1
LN1
)α
LN1
We know that the capital labor ratio will rise while output falls in response to a drop in
the interest rate. Therefore labor allocated to the nontradables sector LN1 falls. Labor
market clearing requires that LT1 rise. In order to maintain equal capital labor ratios
across sectors, capital dedicated to to the production of tradable goods must rise when
the interest rate falls. Therefore when the interest rate rises, the share of investment
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allocated to tradables will rise.
D.4 A Permanent Rise in Productivity in the Trad-
ables Sector
Here we prove that an increase in the productivity of the tradables sector which is per-
manent will lead to an immediate increase in the production of tradable goods. Since
we are considering a permanent increase in tradables sector productivity, AT0 = A
T
1 and
we will express these simply as AT . We also set AN0 equal to unity to simplify notation.
Using the definition of γ, the expression for Y T0 becomes(
1−ω
ω
) [
(Y T0 )
1
1−α +R−1Y2(Y T0 )
α
1−α
]
[
(1 + β)(AT )
(1−α)2
α
+1 + 1−ω
ω
β(AN1 )
1−α(AT )
(1−α)2
α
+α
] + (AT )−1(Y T0 ) 11−α = L.
Calling the denomintor of the first term on the left-hand side of the expresion ψ, note
that ∂ψ/∂AT > 0. Thus we get
∂Y T0
∂AT
=
(
1−ω
ω
) [
(Y T0 )
1
1−α +R−1Y2(Y T0 )
α
1−α
]
∂ψ
∂AT
+ (AT )−2(Y T0 )
1
1−α(
1−ω
ω
)
γ(AT0 )
−
(
(1−α)2
α
+1
) [
1
1−α(Y
T
0 )
1
1−α−1 +R−1Y2 α1−α(Y
T
0 )
α
1−α−1
]
+ (AT )−1(Y T0 )
1
1−α−1
> 0
The fact that capital is fixed in the first period, along with labor market clearing, means
that the increase in tradables production requires a fall in the production of nontradables
and an immediate shift of labor into tradables. Since a permanent increase in tradables
productivity increases both γ and Y T0 , it is clear from the consumption function (D.3)
that current consumption of tradables will rise as well.
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